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NAVIGATING 21ST CENTURY TAX JURISDICTION 
Hayes R. Holderness* 
Hailed as a massive victory for the states, the Supreme Court’s 2018 
decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. brought dated state tax 
jurisdiction standards into the twenty-first century, freeing the states 
to tax internet vendors. However, the decision left the larger state tax 
jurisdiction doctrine undertheorized and at a crossroads: should the 
doctrine concern itself only with notice and fairness issues akin to 
those found in the due process personal jurisdiction realm, or should 
it also concern itself with protecting interstate commerce from undue 
state tax burdens?  
This Article argues for the latter path by developing a robust theory of 
state tax jurisdiction that focuses on the potential undue burdens of tax 
compliance costs, burdens that a threshold jurisdictional standard is 
uniquely able to address. From this compliance burden theory 
emerges a jurisdictional standard which would protect interstate 
commerce—particularly the activities of small businesses and entities 
that facilitate the commerce of others, such as online marketplaces, 
payment intermediaries, and common carriers—from the chilling 
effects of heavy state tax compliance costs. The Article concludes by 
demonstrating how unanswered questions from Wayfair provide 
opportunities to incorporate the proposed standard into the state tax 
jurisdiction doctrine, detailing the way forward from Wayfair. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“So how many sales does it take?” Justice Sotomayor asked during 
oral arguments for South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 1 the landmark 2018 
decision in which the Supreme Court reconsidered decades of doctrine 
regarding state tax power.2 Justice Sotomayor was trying to discern 
when an out-of-state vendor would have a constitutionally-sufficient 
connection with a state such that the state could tax the vendor. The 
South Dakota Attorney General’s answer? “[O]ne sale.”3 Internet 
vendors and small businesses shuddered;4 South Dakota’s position 
could have exposed them to a wealth of new state tax obligations. 
For its part, the Wayfair majority skirted Justice Sotomayor’s 
question and instead concluded that the constitutionally-sufficient 
connection—termed “nexus”5—exists when the taxpayer6 
“purposefully avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business in that jurisdiction.”7 Students of due process personal 
jurisdiction doctrine perked up, but their excitement should be 
tempered. The Wayfair Court was articulating a nexus standard 
imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause, not the Due Process 
Clause,8 and the state tax jurisprudence has recognized that the two 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. My 
sincerest gratitude to those who have offered their time, energy, and insight to help 
improve this Article: Andrew Appleby, Jud Campbell, Erin Collins, Paul Crane, 
Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Kevin Walsh, Corinna Lain, Luke Norris, Rick Pomp, 
Jack Preis, Danny Schaffa, Darien Shanske, Allison Tait, and Adam Thimmesch. 
Thanks also to the participants in the 2018 Junior Tax Scholars Conference at the 
University of Colorado Law School and to the faculty of the Temple University 
Beasley School of Law for their rigorous workshopping of this Article. Finally, for 
her excellent research, I owe a great deal of appreciation to Sherfón Coles-Williams. 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). 
2 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). 
4 Justice Breyer has expressed concerns about state jurisdiction over small 
sellers a number of times, invoking the examples of a small mandolin seller and an 
Appalachian potter. See id.; J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 
2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).   
5 See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power, & 
Policy, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 555, 555 (2010). 
6 For ease of discussion, this Article will refer to a person on whom a state is 
attempting to place an obligation either to collect or to pay a tax as a “taxpayer.” The 
Supreme Court has applied the same jurisdictional rules to both tax collectors and 
taxpayers in the case law. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“As an original matter, it might have been possible to 
distinguish between jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction to compel collection of taxes 
as agent for the State, but we have rejected that.”). 
7 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
8 For ease of discussion, the Article refer to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the Due Process Clause. Likewise, references to due 
process concerns address concerns arising under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not that of the Fifth Amendment. 
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clauses address different concerns.9 The Due Process Clause is 
concerned with fundamental notions of fairness and with providing 
taxpayers notice of state tax power over them; the dormant Commerce 
Clause is concerned with protecting against the “economic 
Balkanization” of the states.10 
The Wayfair majority’s due-process-esque dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus standard is symptomatic of one of the state tax 
jurisprudence’s core problems: the nexus concept is complicated and 
confusing. This confusion manifests throughout the development of 
the case law, which has led to a complicated array of nexus 
requirements. There is a due process nexus requirement which appears 
to track the due process personal jurisdiction requirement,11 and there 
is a dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement that bifurcates into 
requiring both a state connection with the taxpayer and a state 
connection with the activity taxed.12 Adding further to the complexity, 
the standards for both aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement have been undertheorized and underdeveloped in the case 
law, leading to decisions turning on conclusory statements about when 
the standards are satisfied. This Article tackles these problems in order 
to provide coherence to the dormant Commerce clause nexus 
doctrine.13 
Not to sell the decision short, Wayfair did provide some measure 
of coherence to the doctrine by scraping a questionable but long 
                                                 
9 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (“[T]he Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing 
powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax 
may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.”). 
10 See id. at 312; Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
11 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 (discussing the due process nexus requirement). 
12 This Article refers to the two aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the taxpayer—and 
“transactional nexus”—nexus with the activity taxed. Others have used different 
terms to refer to the same concepts. See Arthur R. Rosen & Marc D. Bernstein, State 
Taxation of Corporations: The Evolving Danger of Attributional Nexus, 41 TAX 
EXECUTIVE 533, 534 (1989) (referring to the concepts as “presence nexus” and 
“transactional nexus”); accord Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and 
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 
GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (referring to the concepts as “enforcement jurisdiction” and 
“substantive jurisdiction”). 
13 Those versed in state taxation may be surprised to find no mention of the term 
“substantial nexus” in this Introduction. The reason for this omission is that this 
Article argues that, while the dormant Commerce Clause imposes a threshold 
jurisdictional restriction on states, that restriction comes from the dormant 
Commerce Clause’s prohibition of undue burdens on interstate commerce. Others 
have forcefully argued that the “substantial nexus” term is meaningless and should 
be abandoned. This Article argues that the term, whether meaningless before or not, 
provides a clear place to locate dormant Commerce Clause’s threshold jurisdiction 
inquiry. However, because that inquiry derives from the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s restriction on undue burdens, it is admittedly not necessary to cabin it in the 
existing terminology that pervades state tax jurisprudence. 
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standing dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard requiring a 
taxpayer’s physical presence in the taxing state. This physical presence 
rule had prevented the states from requiring internet vendors like 
Amazon.com to collect their sales taxes, which was a major source of 
frustration for the states.14 Despite bringing the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus standard into the twenty-first century, Wayfair did little 
to address larger confusions over the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement. In particular, the opinion passed up opportunities to give 
meaning to its nexus standard and to better explain the relationship 
between the due process nexus requirement and the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement.15 In short, Wayfair left the 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine in an unhelpful limbo by 
failing to provide a clear path forward for the doctrine. 
This failure has predictably spurred commentary attempting to sort 
out the decision’s meaning, but the commentary has not fully 
addressed the significant crossroads for the dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus doctrine that Wayfair created.16 Two paths diverge from the 
Wayfair crossroads, either of which the decision can be read to 
support: the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard might collapse 
into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, or it might be 
strengthened into a standard that addresses in earnest the threat of 
economic Balkanization that the dormant Commerce Clause targets. 
Should the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard be allowed to 
collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, many 
taxpayers would face uncertain and potentially burdensome state tax 
                                                 
14 See infra note 219. 
15 The lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the Due Process Clause 
and the dormant Commerce Clause in jurisdictional settings is not limited to the area 
of state taxation. See generally John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a 
Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121 (2016) (analyzing the 
relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause in 
the context of personal adjudicative jurisdiction). 
16 E.g. Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair and the Myth of Substantial Nexus, 36 J. ST. 
TAXATION 27 (2018); Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s Fair, and Undue Burden, 
90 ST. TAX NOTES 857 (2018);Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive 
and Enforcement Jurisdiction in a Post-Wayfair World, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 283 
(2018); Billy Hamilton, Wayfair Emotional Support, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 1067 (2018); 
Jeffery S. Reed, What Is the New Constitutional Test After Wayfair?, 89 ST. TAX 
NOTES 335 (2018); Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kolarik II, Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 125 (2018). Adam 
Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage have examined major implications 
of the decision in an informative series of articles. See Adam Thimmesch, Darien 
Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden, 89 ST. 
TAX NOTES 447 (2018) [hereinafter, Substantial Nexus]; Adam Thimmesch, Darien 
Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus, 
89 ST. TAX NOTES 975 (2018) [hereinafter, Sales Tax Formalism]; Darien Shanske, 
David Gamage, & Adam Thimmesch, Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors, 
90 ST. TAX NOTES 111 (2018) [hereinafter, Marketplaces]. Others have considered 
implications of the decision outside of the tax law. See Allan Erbsen, Wayfair 
Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State Tax Authority 
and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
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obligations, which may chill their willingness to engage in interstate 
commerce.17 Taxpayers of particular concern are small business and 
entities that facilitate the commerce of others, such as online 
marketplaces similar to Amazon Marketplace and eBay, payment 
intermediaries like MasterCard and Visa, and common carriers such as 
FedEx and UPS. 
To prevent these harms and realize the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s goal of protecting the national economy from unduly 
burdensome state actions, the Wayfair crossroads must be navigated 
carefully. Doing so demands a robust theory of the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus requirement to guide the doctrine forward. This Article 
seizes on the opportunity presented by Wayfair and develops such a 
theory—the “compliance burden theory”—as well as the standard that 
follows from that theory. While others have theorized the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement in the past,18 this Article is the 
first to incorporate the lessons from Wayfair into the theory and to 
develop a post-Wayfair standard from that theory.  
The compliance burden theory is realized by returning to the 
fundamental principle driving the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine: the protection of interstate commerce from undue burdens of 
state actions. The Article asks what role, if any, a threshold nexus 
requirement has to play in fulfilling this principle in the context of state 
taxation. A state tax might burden interstate commerce through a high 
tax rate, a distorted tax base, or heavy tax compliance costs.  
Established guardrails protect interstate commerce from unduly 
burdensome tax rates and tax bases, but heavy tax compliance costs 
present a different breed of problem for interstate commerce. Tax 
compliance costs include such things as the labor and systems required 
to ensure that taxes are correctly paid, the ability to access funds to pay 
the tax, and the costs and risks associated with handling audits by state 
                                                 
17 Preis makes a similar argument in the context of personal adjudicative 
jurisdiction based on the registration of a business in a state; though the Due Process 
Clause may be satisfied, such exercises of jurisdiction over interstate businesses 
could prevent those businesses from registering in the state or from entering the state 
at all. See Preis, supra note 15, at 144-54. 
18 See, e.g., Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 331-
39 (2018) (offering a rationale for the physical presence rule based on the taxpayer’s 
ability to access funds from the activity taxed); Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller 
Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1144-45 (2016) (offering 
a political rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement in that it 
allowed the Supreme Court to pass the issue to Congress); Gamage & Heckman, 
supra note 21, at 498-503 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement is concerned about the excess burden placed on interstate taxpayers 
subject to multiple tax compliance regimes); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax 
Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. 
TAX REV. 1, 4 (2008) (offering a political-voice-based justification for the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus and apportionment regimes). 
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revenue departments.19 These costs are relatively flat; they hit 
interstate commerce immediately once a state tax is imposed and 
change little as the amount of the activity taxed increases.20 
A threshold nexus inquiry is uniquely situated to protect interstate 
commerce from the burden of tax compliance costs by preventing the 
taxing state from imposing a tax (and thus the tax compliance costs) 
on interstate commerce until the amount of activity in the state is 
profitable enough to cover the compliance costs. From this conclusion 
arises the compliance burden theory. The theory requires the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement to target tax compliance costs,21 
rather than simply collapsing into the due process personal jurisdiction 
standard. The answer to Justice Sotomayor’s question—“[s]o how 
many sales does it take?”—is that it depends on how profitable the 
sales are and how difficult the state tax is to comply with. 
This Article makes the case for aligning the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus doctrine with the compliance burden theory in order to 
ensure that interstate commerce is appropriately protected from the 
burdens of state taxes. First, Part I provides the necessary background 
to understand the challenges and opportunities that the historical 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus case law presents for developing the 
nexus doctrine in this way. That discussion culminates in an 
exploration of the crossroads at which Wayfair has left the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. 
Part II then maps out in detail the compliance burden theory and 
the standard that follows from that theory before Part III provides the 
path forward for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. This 
path forward is illustrated by looking ahead to litigation expected to 
spawn from the questions left unanswered by Wayfair. For instance, 
many states are expanding their sales tax collection laws to apply to 
marketplaces, such as Amazon Marketplace and eBay, that connect 
                                                 
19 See infra note 179. 
20 See infra note 180.  
21 Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion pre-Wayfair. See 
Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach To Nexus Under The Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 110-12 (2018) (discussing 
dormant Commerce Clause issues presented by cumulative tax compliance burdens); 
David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of 
E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 497 (2012) (“[T]he burden on interstate 
commerce that troubled the Court in Quill arises solely from the potential for remote 
vendors to be subject to excess tax compliance costs”); John A. Swain, State Sales 
and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 361-64 (2003) (arguing for the Quill Court’s concern 
with cumulative tax compliance burdens on multistate taxpayers). However, those 
commentators’ analysis differs from that in this Article because they argue that the 
substantial nexus requirement is concerned with the cumulative burden of multiple 
taxing jurisdictions placing tax compliance costs on interstate commerce, whereas 
this Article argues that such cumulative burdens are not the proper focus of the 
substantial nexus requirement. See infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text. 
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vendors to consumers. Anticipated challenges to these unprecedented 
expansions of state tax power provide opportunities to build on 
Wayfair by articulating a clearer dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard than Wayfair did. In addition, the South Dakota statute at 
issue in Wayfair, which has served as the model for other states, is 
drafted in such a way as to perfectly tee up the question of what 
connection the dormant Commerce Clause requires between the taxing 
state and the activity taxed. Potential litigation over a South Dakota-
type statute is thus an ideal avenue for bringing the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus doctrine in line with the compliance burden theory.  
Those readers versed in state taxation may be surprised to find no 
mention of the term “substantial nexus” in this Introduction up to this 
point.22 The reason for this omission is that this Article argues that, 
while the dormant Commerce Clause imposes a threshold 
jurisdictional restriction on states, that restriction comes from the 
dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition of undue burdens on 
interstate commerce and is not dependent on that term.23 In fact, others 
have forcefully argued that the “substantial nexus” term is hollow and 
should be abandoned.24 This Article takes the position that the term, 
whether meaningless before Wayfair or not, provides a clear place to 
locate the dormant Commerce Clause’s threshold jurisdictional 
inquiry.25 However, because that inquiry derives from the dormant 
Commerce Clause’s restriction on undue burdens, it is admittedly not 
necessary to cabin it in the existing terminology that pervades state tax 
jurisprudence; if the term “substantial nexus” is abandoned, the 
analysis of state tax actions proposed in this Article would remain 
necessary. 
With the case for a dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine 
which meaningfully focuses on tax compliance costs having been laid 
out, Part IV concludes. The Wayfair case marks a high point for 
coherence in the evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
doctrine and presents an opportunity for continued growth. As this 
Article demonstrates, this opportunity must be seized upon rather than 
risk harms to interstate commerce resulting from an unclear and 
untargeted dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard. 
I. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS AND WAYFAIR 
When a state attempts to impose a tax, the first legal question is 
often “is there nexus?” “Nexus” is a term of art in the state tax 
                                                 
22 According to the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298, 311 (1992), the dormant Commerce Clause requires a “substantial nexus” with 
the taxing state before the state may impose tax on someone or something. See infra 
notes 37-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “substantial nexus” term. 
23 See Part II, infra. 
24 See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 16. 
25 See Part III, infra. 
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jurisprudence which refers to the constitutionally-sufficient 
connection a state needs with the thing it would like to subject to tax.26 
Without the appropriate nexus, the state lacks the power to tax. As 
straightforward as the basic concept may seem, nexus doctrine has 
developed into a complex muddle. This Part first provides an overview 
of the law on nexus and then turns to how Wayfair affected that law, 
all to provide the necessary background for the analysis that follows. 
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus before Wayfair 
During most of the historical state tax jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the U.S. Constitution imposed a nexus 
requirement on state taxes but located that requirement in the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause together.27 As a result, cases 
appeared to turn on different applications of the nexus requirement; 
some applications bent more towards due process fairness and notice 
rationales while others bent more towards preventing undue burdens 
on interstate commerce.28 The resulting “quagmire” of law did not go 
unnoticed by the Court.29 
In 1992’s Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,30 the Supreme Court 
addressed this quagmire by engaging in the unprecedented splitting of 
the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause analyses 
of nexus.31 According to the Quill Court, this split was appropriate 
because of the different natures of the inquiries under each clause.32 
As explained in Quill, the Due Process Clause demands that a 
taxing state have nexus with the person it seeks to tax.33 The basic 
rationales for the due process nexus requirement are to ensure the 
fundamental fairness of state taxation and to ensure that the taxpayer 
has notice of the state’s tax jurisdiction over her.34 This due process 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 5, at 555. 
27 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (“[A]lthough we have 
not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause 
and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.”) see also Pomp, supra note 18, 
at 1149 (“Prior to Quill, the Court never had any reason to specify whether a nexus 
decision was grounded on one clause or the other.”). 
28 See, e.g., infra note 57 (comparing two cases with similar fact patterns which 
were decided by invoking different constitutional concerns). 
29 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16 (“[O]ur law in this area is something of a 
‘quagmire’ and the ‘application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes 
leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise 
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.’”) citing 
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 
(1959). 
30 Quill, 504 U.S. 298. 
31 Id. at 313. For a thorough analysis of the Quill decision and its flaws, see 
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1141-54. 
32 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305-06. 
33 Id. at 312. 
34 Id. at 312. 
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nexus requirement is satisfied, the Supreme Court has explained, when 
the taxpayer purposefully avails itself of the state’s marketplace and 
the state provides some benefit in return to the taxpayer.35 For the most 
part, the due process nexus standard maps on to the due process 
standard for personal jurisdiction, which looks to whether the person 
has “minimum contacts” with the state.36 Although the due process 
nexus requirement is not the focus of this Article, it does provide an 
important contrast to the nexus requirement of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
According to the Quill Court, the dormant Commerce Clause 
requires something different from the Due Process Clause: a 
“substantial nexus.”37 The Quill Court gleaned this substantial nexus 
requirement from the 1977 Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady case,38 
but it was not clear that the Complete Auto Court thought the term 
“substantial nexus” had legal significance. The term first appeared in 
the tax case law in Complete Auto,39 and the Complete Auto Court 
casually interchanged “substantial nexus” with the term “sufficient 
nexus” throughout the opinion.40 
Despite the term’s history, the Quill Court did little to clarify the 
meaning of “substantial nexus”—so little that some commentators 
have argued that the term should be recognized as problematic and 
abandoned.41 However, the Court did offer an explanation of the 
driving force behind this dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement: “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation 
on the national economy.”42 For the first time in the jurisprudence, the 
                                                 
35 See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and 
Take of State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 402-04 (2017) (fully exploring the 
requirements of the due process nexus). 
36 Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 (finding that due process nexus considerations are 
“comparable” to due process personal jurisdiction considerations). 
37 Id. at 311 (“[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so 
long as the ‘tax . . . is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
State . . . .’”) (emphasis added). 
38 Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
39 Pomp, supra note 18, at 1147. 
40 Compare Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (“These decisions . . . have sustained 
a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with 
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the 
State.”) with Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (“[T]he Court held that net income 
from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state 
taxation, provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local 
activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the tax.”); see 
also Pomp, supra note 18, at 1147. 
41 See Pomp, supra note 18, at 1144-45 (arguing that the “substantial nexus” 
term is problematic in part because the term was not intended to have the meaning 
ascribed to it by the Quill Court, which utilized the term as a tool for the Court to 
split the nexus analysis to allow Congress to overturn the physical presence rule). 
42 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
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Court explicitly set the dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state 
tax power apart from those of the Due Process Clause.43 The Court 
also observed that the standards are “not identical” and that “while a 
State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority 
to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless 
violate the Commerce Clause.”44 
Finally, the Quill Court appeared to effectively recognize two 
aspects of this dormant Commerce Clause substantial nexus 
requirement by asking whether the “tax is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State” but by examining whether the 
taxpayer had a physical presence in the taxing state.45 This Article 
refers to these two aspects of the substantial nexus requirement 
respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the taxpayer—and 
“transactional nexus”—nexus with the activity taxed.46 The following 
chart provides a visual summary of the various nexus requirements 
discussed above:47 
                                                 
43 See supra note 31. 
44 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312-13. Many commentators have argued that the 
substantial nexus standard should not impose a higher bar on states than the due 
process nexus standard. See, e.g., Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in 
State and Local Taxation, 67 TAX LAW. 623, 630 (2014) (“If the Due Process Clause 
requires certain minimum contacts with a state, the Commerce Clause does not 
require a greater number of contacts.”); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise 
of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 188-91 (2012) (discussing the 
“gratuitous elevation of the Commerce Clause over the Due Process Clause”); Jesse 
H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The 
Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 213 (1998) (“We do not 
interpret the Commerce Clause to require a separate nexus more stringent than that 
imposed by the Due Process Clause because that is not required to further protect 
interstate commerce against state taxes that accord a preference to local 
enterprises.”). 
45 Compare Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing the Complete Auto test, which includes 
the transactional nexus requirement, with approval) with Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18 
(upholding the requirement that the taxpayer have a physical presence in the taxing 
state in order to create substantial nexus); see also Holderness, supra note 18, at 330-
31. 
46 See supra note 12. 
47 As the following discussion lays bare, the nexus concepts are not neat and 
tidy. Readers should be cautious of allowing the tidiness of this chart to bleed into 
their understanding of the nexus concepts. Instead, the chart offers a high-level view 
of the types of nexus issues that have arisen in the jurisprudence; often it is difficult 
to carve out the limits of the nexus issues or to avoid overlap of the issues.  
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The following two subsections separately explore the history 
behind the personal nexus and transactional nexus aspects of the 
substantial nexus requirement in order to provide the background 
necessary to evaluate the impact of Wayfair on the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus doctrine.  
1. Personal Nexus 
Although the personal nexus aspect of the substantial nexus 
requirement was first explicitly recognized in Quill,48 the roots of the 
aspect are found in pre-Quill case law,49 particularly 1967’s National 
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois.50 In Bellas Hess, the 
Supreme Court considered whether Illinois had the authority to require 
an out-of-state vendor to collect sales and use taxes on mail order sales 
to the state’s residents.51 The company had no physical location or 
employees in the state, accepted the orders outside of the state, and 
delivered them into the state through common carrier.52 The 
                                                 
48 Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-18 (discussing the personal nexus requirement). 
49 Prior to Quill, the Court’s tendency to refer to both the Due Process Clause 
and the dormant Commerce Clause together when discussing nexus obscured the 
source of the personal nexus requirement, and it might have been argued that such 
connections were solely due process concerns. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t 
of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 356-58 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part, concurring 
in part) (arguing that both the origin states and market states in the Dilworth and 
General Trading Co. cases should have jurisdiction to tax under the due process 
clause, and that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with more substantive 
effects of the taxes at issue). Such arguments continued to be made after Quill. Pomp 
cautions against such arguments given the lack of clarity from the decisions. Pomp, 
supra note 18, at 1149-50. 
50 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
51 Id. at 754. Pomp provides an expert dissection of the Bellas Hess case in 
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1133-40. 
52 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754-55. 
Tax Jurisdiction
Due Process 
Clause
Nexus 
(akin to personal 
jurisdiction)
Dormant 
Commerce Clause
Substantial Nexus
Personal Nexus 
(nexus with the 
taxpayer)
Transactional 
Nexus (nexus with 
the activity taxed)
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company’s only arguable physical presence in Illinois appeared to be 
the catalogues that it mailed to potential customers.53  
Considering these facts, the Bellas Hess Court declared that: 
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use 
tax burdens on [National Bellas Hess] in this case, we 
would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction 
which these and other decisions have drawn between 
mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or 
property within a State, and those who do no more than 
communicate with customers in the State by mail or 
common carrier as part of a general interstate business. 
But this basic distinction, which until now has been 
generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is 
a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.54 
In this way, the Bellas Hess Court expressed a concern that a taxpayer 
have a connection with the taxing state—that personal nexus exist. By 
drawing a line between mail order vendors and brick and mortar 
retailers, the Court indicated that the personal nexus requirement could 
be, and perhaps must be, satisfied by the physical presence of the 
taxpayer.55  
Although it is risky to characterize pre-Quill nexus decisions as 
addressing due process requirements or dormant Commerce Clause 
requirements because the cases rarely addressed the clauses 
separately,56 the dormant Commerce Clause concerns underpinning 
the Bellas Hess decision are clear.57 In reaching its decision, the Bellas 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 758. 
55 The Bellas Hess’ Court’s view of the taxpayer’s physical presence as a 
necessary condition for personal nexus is unclear because the Court relied on cases 
where the taxpayer was physically present in the taxing state for its position in Bellas 
Hess. See Holderness, supra note 18, at 353 (explaining that the Bellas Hess Court 
appropriately observed that its prior decisions had not found personal nexus with a 
taxpayer lacking a physical presence in the state but failed to contextualize this 
observation by noting that all but one of those decisions involved taxpayers 
physically present in the taxing states). 
56 Pomp, supra note 18, at 1149-50. 
57 Bellas Hess may be characterized as expressing dormant Commerce Clause 
concerns by comparing it to another case with similar substantive facts, Miller 
Brothers Company v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). Miller Brothers involved 
Maryland’s effort to require a Delaware-based store to collect Maryland’s use tax on 
products the store sold to Maryland residents in Maryland. As relevant here, the 
Miller Brothers business had no physical location or employees in Maryland, 
accepted the orders in question in Delaware, and delivered them into the state 
through common carrier. The relevant difference between Miller Brothers and Bellas 
Hess is that the Miller Brothers were found not to have systematically exploited the 
Maryland marketplace, unlike National Bellas Hess’ efforts to make sales into 
Illinois. Compare Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347 (“Here was no invasion or 
exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland.”) with Bellas Hess, 368 U.S. at 
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Hess Court observed that the “many variations in rates of tax, in 
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping 
requirements could entangle [National Bellas Hess’] interstate 
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost 
of the local government.’”58 This concern for the burden on National 
Bellas Hess’ interstate business echoed the concerns of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, not the notice and fairness concerns of the Due 
Process Clause.59 
In 1992, Quill advanced the personal nexus doctrine from Bellas 
Hess in a number of ways. After explicitly separating the substantial 
nexus requirement from the due process nexus requirement and 
articulating the personal nexus aspect of substantial nexus,60 the Quill 
Court clarified that the physical presence rule it derived from Bellas 
Hess—a taxpayer must have a physical presence in a state before the 
state can require it to collect sales and use taxes61—was housed under 
the dormant Commerce Clause personal nexus aspect.62  
                                                 
754-55 (“Twice a year catalogues are mailed to the company’s active or recent 
customers throughout the Nation, including Illinois. This mailing is supplemented 
by advertising ‘flyers’ which are occasionally mailed to past and potential 
customers.”).  
Because of Miller Brothers’ lack of exploitation of the Maryland marketplace, 
the Court held that Maryland had no tax jurisdiction over the business and further 
stated that “we need not consider whether the statute imposes an unjustifiable burden 
upon interstate commerce.” Thus, viewed in today’s terms, the Miller Brothers 
decision not only invoked due process standards of purposeful availment in reaching 
its decision, it also specifically stated that the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry 
was moot. Miller Brothers must be understood as a due process nexus case. In 
contrast, the Bellas Hess Court could not have relied solely on due process 
considerations to deny Illinois’ jurisdiction over the taxpayer because National 
Bellas Hess was actively exploiting the Illinois marketplace. 
One difficulty in comparing the two cases is that the Miller Brothers Company 
did target Maryland customers in similar ways as National Bellas Hess targeted 
Illinois customers. See Bellas Hess, 368 U.S. at 758 (“[In Miller Bros.,] the seller 
advertised its wares to Maryland residents through newspaper and radio advertising, 
in addition to mailing circulars four times a year. As a result, it made substantial sales 
to Maryland customers, and made deliveries to them by its own trucks and drivers.”). 
To accept the point made here in this Article, one must accept the Miller Brothers 
Court’s questionable legal determination that there was no exploitation of the 
Maryland market by the store. The Bellas Hess Court did not make such a finding in 
its decision and strangely attempted to distinguish the Miller Brothers conclusion as 
being about how much of the commerce was interstate commerce. See Bellas Hess, 
368 U.S. at 759. 
For further dissection of the Miller Brothers case, the faults within it, and what 
might have been, see Pomp, supra note 18, at 1121-32. 
58 Bellas Hess, 386 U. S. at 759-760. 
59 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (detailing the 
concerns of the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause). 
60 See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. 
61 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. 
62 Id. at 318. 
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Perhaps most important to the post-Wayfair world, the Quill Court 
also articulated the different motivations for the two nexus inquires. 
The Court explained that “the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, 
like due process’ ‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, 
but rather a means for limiting state burdens on interstate 
commerce.”63 In a footnote, the Court described how a tax might 
unduly burden interstate commerce: 
[A]bsent the [physical presence] rule, a publisher who 
included a subscription card in three issues of its 
magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were 
heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a 
corporation whose telephone sales force made three 
calls into the State, all would be subject to the [use tax] 
collection duty. What is more significant, similar 
obligations might be imposed by the Nation's 6,000-
plus taxing jurisdictions.64 
In short, tax obligations resulting from small connections with the 
taxing state troubled the Court, as did the potential for such obligations 
to spread across the country if North Dakota’s law was upheld. 
However, the underlying nature of the Court’s concerns remained 
somewhat obscure after Quill. Perhaps the administrative costs to an 
interstate taxpayer of complying with tax regimes were at the core of 
the concerns,65 or perhaps the Court was anxious about the overall tax 
burden that might fall to interstate taxpayers if the personal nexus 
standard was loosened.66 The Court would provide no further guidance 
until Wayfair.67 
2. Transactional Nexus 
Transactional nexus has a longer, though perhaps quieter, history 
in the case law than personal nexus. The best place to start when 
uncovering the transactional nexus requirement is with the 1944 
                                                 
63 Id. at 313. 
64 Id. at 313 n.6. 
65 See id.; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 
759-60 (1967). 
66 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-16 (“Undue burdens on interstate commerce may 
be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by 
particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a 
discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation.”); Bellas 
Hess, 386 U.S. at 759 (“And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon 
National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its 
interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose 
such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every 
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with 
power to impose sales and use taxes.”). 
67 See Holderness, supra note 18, at 315-16 (observing that the Supreme Court 
rejected certiorari in all challenges to the physical presence rule after Quill and until 
Wayfair). 
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companion cases of McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.68 and General 
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa69. In these cases, the 
Supreme Court considered nearly identical fact patterns: an out-of-
state vendor sold to residents of the taxing state and the products sold 
were delivered into the state from out of state by common carrier.70 
The only relevant difference in the Court’s view was that in Dilworth, 
Arkansas demanded that the vendor collect a sales tax imposed on the 
sales transactions,71 and in General Trading Co., Iowa demanded that 
the vendor collect a use tax imposed on the in-state use of the products 
originally sold in Minnesota.72 
Because the states imposed different taxes, the cases reached 
different results. Though personal nexus arguably existed with respect 
to each out-of-state vendor, Arkansas could not require the vendor to 
collect its sales tax,73 but Iowa was permitted require the vendor to 
collect its use tax.74 Transactional nexus was at the core of these 
decisions; in Dilworth, Arkansas simply lacked a sufficient connection 
with the sales it sought to tax because they were consummated outside 
of the state (i.e., there was no local sale for Arkansas to tax), whereas 
in General Trading Co., Iowa had such a connection with the in-state 
use of the products sold.75 It did not matter to the Court that sales and 
                                                 
68 McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
69 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
70 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328; General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 337. 
71 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327 (“We are asked to reverse a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas holding that the Commerce Clause precludes liability for the sales 
tax of that State upon the transactions to be set forth.”). 
72 General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336 (“The question now presented is, in 
short, whether Iowa may collect, in the circumstances of this case, such a use tax 
from General Trading Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the basis of property 
bought from Trading Company and sent by it from Minnesota to purchasers in Iowa 
for use and enjoyment there.”). Although sales taxes and use taxes are formally 
imposed on separate transactions, they have largely been thought of as economically 
equivalent taxes on consumption. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 347 (2018); 
Charles E. McLure Jr., State/Local Taxes on Interstate Commerce: Legitimacy and 
Fairness, 93 TAX NOTES 7703 ¶¶ 9-16 (2001). The use tax is often framed as merely 
a backstop to the sales tax, necessary only because of the historically limited 
jurisdictional reach of sales taxes. See RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL 
TAXATION, at 6-40 to 6-44 (9th ed., 2019); see also Paul J. Hartman, Sales Taxation 
in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138, 165 (1956); Robert C. Brown, The 
Future of Use Taxes, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1941). 
73 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transaction 
would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate 
transaction.”). 
74 General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (observing “the right of Iowa . . . to 
exact a use tax from purchasers on mail order goods forwarded into Iowa from 
without the State.”). 
75 Compare Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“We would have to destroy both business 
and legal notions to deny that under these circumstances the sale—the transfer of 
ownership—was made in Tennessee.”) with General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 
(“The tax is what it professes to be—a non-discriminatory excise laid on all personal 
property consumed in Iowa. The property is enjoyed by an Iowa resident partly 
because the opportunity is given by Iowa to enjoy property no matter whence 
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use taxes are complementary and often reach the same economic 
result.76 
In what would turn out to be a highly influential opinion to the 
Quill Court,77 Justice Rutledge penned a partial dissent, partial 
concurrence that addressed both the Dilworth and General Trading 
Co. cases.78 In his opinion, Justice Rutledge argued that there was no 
room for a nexus inquiry under the dormant Commerce Clause.79 In 
his view, issues of state tax jurisdiction were due process concerns, 
and the dormant Commerce Clause should be setting rules of tax 
priority between multiple states that have jurisdiction over the activity 
taxed.80 Therefore, he believed both Arkansas and Iowa had nexus 
with the consumption they sought to tax through their respective sales 
tax and use tax, and he rejected the opposing outcomes of the Dilworth 
and General Trading Co. cases as based on formalistic distinctions.81 
Justice Rutledge argued that the dormant Commerce Clause would 
provide a remedy only once interstate consumption was subject to 
higher cumulative tax burdens than intrastate consumption, and that 
that remedy would be to prioritize the market state’s right to tax over 
that of the origin state.82 
                                                 
acquired. The exaction is made against the ultimate consumer—the Iowa resident 
who is paying taxes to sustain his own state government.”); see also Nelson v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (“The fact that under Iowa law the sale is 
made outside of the state does not mean that the power of Iowa ‘has nothing on which 
to operate.’ The purchaser is in Iowa and the tax is upon use in Iowa. The validity of 
such a tax, so far as the purchaser is concerned, ‘has been withdrawn from the arena 
of debate.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
76 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“A sales tax and a use tax in many instances may 
bring about the same result. But they are different in conception, are assessments 
upon different transactions, and in the interlacings of the two legislative authorities 
within our federation may have to justify themselves on different constitutional 
grounds.”). 
77 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1992) (quoting Justice 
Rutledge’s opinion before proceeding to “[h]eed[] Justice Rutledge’s counsel, [and] 
consider each constitutional limit in turn.”). 
78 Justice Rutledge’s opinion was filed in the case of International Harvester 
Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944), which was a third companion case to 
Dilworth and General Trading Co. 
79 Int’l Harvester, at 356-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) 
(arguing that both the origin states and market states in the Dilworth and General 
Trading Co. cases should have jurisdiction to tax under the due process clause, and 
that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with more substantive effects of the 
taxes at issue). 
80 Id. at 359. 
81 Id. at 352 (“The only other difference is in the terms used by Iowa and 
Arkansas, respectively, to describe their taxes. . . . Other things being the same, 
constitutionality should not turn on whether one name or the other is applied by the 
state.”). 
82 Id. at 361 (“If in this case it were necessary to choose between the state of 
origin and that of market for the exercise of exclusive power to tax, or for requiring 
allowance of credit in order to avoid the cumulative burden, in my opinion the choice 
should lie in favor of the state of market rather than the state of origin.”). 
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By articulating different motivations behind the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause in the state 
tax context and analyzing those requirements separately, Justice 
Rutledge’s opinion laid groundwork for the split of the due process 
and dormant Commerce Clause analyses in Quill.83 However, when 
the Quill Court made that split, it failed to also adopt Justice Rutledge’s 
position that the dormant Commerce Clause did not contain a nexus 
requirement. Instead, the Quill Court appeared to incorporate the 
transactional nexus requirement into the dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis by claiming that “we will sustain a tax against a Commerce 
Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State . . . .’”84 
Dilworth and General Trading Co. offer a rare source for 
discerning the demands of this transactional nexus requirement 
because usually there is no controversy around whether transactional 
nexus exists. For example, no transactional nexus issue existed in Quill 
because the activity taxed clearly took place in the taxing state.85 The 
development of the transactional nexus doctrine has thus been subtler 
than that of the personal nexus doctrine, as only a few cases have 
offered sparse additional insight into the transactional nexus 
requirement. 
In the 1951 case of Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of 
Illinois,86 the taxpayer was a manufacturer based in Massachusetts that 
had established an office and warehouse in Illinois. The taxpayer made 
local retail sales out of the office and also made mail order sales out of 
its Massachusetts establishments. The taxpayer argued that those mail 
order sales could not be included in its Illinois tax base because they 
were made in interstate commerce.87 Though the idea that interstate 
commerce cannot be subject to state taxation has since been 
abandoned, the Court denied the taxpayer’s challenge because the 
Illinois office performed multiple functions in the state relating to the 
mail order sales.88  
In reaching its decision and important to the transactional nexus 
concept, the Court observed that “[u]nless some local incident occurs 
sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power, the vendor 
is not taxable.”89 The Court cited Dilworth for this position. Further, 
                                                 
83 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1992). 
84 Id. at 311. 
85 See id. at 301 (“This case . . . involves a State’s attempt to require an out-of-
state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State 
to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.”) (emphasis 
added). 
86 Norton Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 340 U.S. 534 (1951). 
87 Id. at 535-36. 
88 Id. at 538-39. 
89 Id. at 537 
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the Court stated that when a taxpayer “has gone into the State to do 
local business by state permission and has submitted itself to the taxing 
power of the State, it can avoid taxation on some Illinois sales only by 
showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local 
business and interstate in nature.”90 Though the Norton Court couched 
its analysis in terms of whether an activity was local or interstate in 
nature, the decision indicates that an activity must have some local 
connection to a state before the state can tax it—transactional nexus is 
required.  
In the 1989 case of Goldberg v. Sweet,91 the Court considered 
whether Illinois could impose an excise tax on telecommunications 
that originated or terminated in the state and were charged to a service 
address in the state.92 Although the Court initially dismissed 
transactional nexus concerns as moot,93 it later returned to the question 
with brief, but somewhat illuminating, dicta as it discussed concerns 
about multiple taxation:94  
We doubt that States through which the telephone call’s 
electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus 
to tax that call. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 
U.S. 623, 631 (1973) (State has no nexus to tax an 
airplane based solely on its flight over the State); 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 
302-304 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (same). We 
also doubt that termination of an interstate telephone 
call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for 
a State to tax a call. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) 
(receipt of mail provides insufficient nexus). 
We believe that only two States have a nexus 
substantial enough to tax a consumer’s purchase of an 
interstate telephone call. The first is a State like Illinois 
which taxes the origination or termination of an 
interstate telephone call charged to a service address 
within that State. The second is a State which taxes the 
origination or termination of an interstate telephone call 
billed or paid within that State.95   
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
92 Id. at 254-57. 
93 Id. at 260 (“As all parties agree that Illinois has a substantial nexus with the 
interstate telecommunications reached by the Tax Act, we begin our inquiry with 
apportionment, the second prong of the Complete Auto test.”). 
94 Id. at 262-63. 
95 Id. at 263. 
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While the Court did not expand on why it held the nexus beliefs it 
articulated, this dicta demonstrates that the transactional nexus aspect 
demands some local hook for the activity taxed beyond its simple 
beginning, end, and location. The importance of a local billing or 
service address to a telephone call is unclear, but such an address may 
indicate to the Court’s satisfaction that tax compliance is not too 
burdensome because some familiarity exists between the local 
taxpayers and the taxing state’s tax system. Alternatively, the 
administrative near-impossibility of taxing telecommunications based 
on the location of the signals may have caused the Court to fear that if 
a state like Illinois was not permitted to tax the telecommunications, 
no state would be able to, effectively shielding the interstate activities 
from state taxation and setting the clock back on the state taxation of 
interstate commerce.96  
In 1995’s Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,97 the 
Supreme Court considered whether Oklahoma could impose its sales 
tax on the full value of bus tickets sold in Oklahoma for interstate 
travel.98 Relying on Goldberg and earlier cases, the Court had no 
difficulty proclaiming that Oklahoma had “nexus aplenty” with the 
sales, thus no transactional nexus controversy existed.99 Jefferson 
Lines advanced the transactional nexus doctrine by clarifying that the 
inquiry is not a means of prioritizing different states’ tax claims, rather 
it is a simple threshold connection question.100 
Although transactional nexus issues have not surfaced at the 
Supreme Court level with much frequency, numerous lower courts 
have addressed the transactional nexus requirement, often citing to 
                                                 
96 Thanks to Rick Pomp for bringing this concern to my attention. See infra note 
169 for cases rejecting state tax immunity for interstate commerce. 
97 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
98 Id. at 177. 
99 Id. at 184. 
100 Id. (“[T]he taxpayer does not deny Oklahoma’s substantial nexus to the 
instate portion of the bus service, but rather argues that nexus to the State is 
insufficient as to the portion of travel outside its borders. This point, however, goes 
to the second prong of Complete Auto . . . .”). The full dormant Commerce Clause 
test relied on in Quill derives from the Complete Auto case and is referred to as the 
“Complete Auto test.” The second prong of the test demands that a tax be fairly 
apportioned to the amount of activity occurring in the taxing state. See infra note 154 
and accompanying text for a full description of the Complete Auto test. 
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Dilworth.101 Thus, the transactional nexus requirement was alive and 
well, though underdeveloped and undertheorized, pre-Wayfair.102  
Heading into Wayfair then, states and taxpayers were faced with a 
dysfunctional physical presence rule for personal nexus and a 
conclusory transactional nexus standard that had created highly 
formalistic distinctions regarding state tax jurisdiction. Hopes were 
high that the Supreme Court would introduce more coherence into the 
substantial nexus doctrine by abandoning the physical presence rule 
and the formalism in the transactional nexus doctrine. As detailed in 
the next section, Wayfair partially delivered on these hopes by 
delivering a narrow opinion which discarded the physical presence rule 
but left the greater dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine 
unsettled. 
B. Wayfair: Substantial Nexus at a Crossroads 
As the evolutions of the personal nexus and the transactional nexus 
doctrines demonstrate, the dormant Commerce Clause’s substantial 
nexus jurisprudence is, at a minimum, complex. Much of the 
complexity was created by undertheorized expressions of the need for 
the substantial nexus requirement, which led to analytically 
unsatisfying conclusions about when such nexus existed. 
As this section explains, 2018’s Wayfair decision brought a 
measure of coherence to the personal nexus doctrine but failed to 
address transactional nexus issues or the substantial nexus doctrine 
more broadly. In so doing, the case brought the substantial nexus 
doctrine into the twenty-first century but left it at a crossroads: the 
doctrine can either wither away by collapsing into the due process 
personal jurisdiction standard or it can be strengthened into a coherent 
standard that addresses the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The next Part then argues for the latter path by developing a robust 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 908 (Ohio 2016); Irwin 
Naturals v. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 P.3d 689, 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016); 
Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 329 P.3d 131, 148 (Wyo. 2014); 
Travelscape, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 705 S.E.2d 28, 37 (S.C. 2011); TA Operating 
Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 767 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
General Motors Corp. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 990 P.2d 59, 66 (Colo. 1999); World 
Book, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 590 N.W.2d 293, 297-98 (Mich. 1999); State v. 
Dorhout, 513 N.W.2d 390, 393 (S.D. 1994); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. State ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 862 P.2d 471, 476-77 (Okla. 1993); Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 839 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992). 
102 See authorities cited supra note 101; see also Gamage & Heckman, supra 
note 21, at 490 (“Together, [Dilworth and General Trading Co.] established a 
dichotomy between sales and use taxes that remains in effect to this day: purchases 
that occur within a state may be subject to sales taxation while purchases from remote 
vendors may only be subject to use taxation.”). 
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theory of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement to guide 
the doctrine forward. 
1. A Vague Personal Nexus Standard 
Wayfair was a case about the physical presence rule for personal 
nexus.103 The case came about in an interesting manner. In response to 
a concurrence by Justice Kennedy in a 2015 case in which the Justice 
offered a scathing critique of the physical presence rule,104 South 
Dakota passed a law which explicitly disregarded the rule for purposes 
of sales tax collection obligations in the state.105 Instead, the South 
Dakota law imposed a sales tax collection obligation on any vendor 
who collected gross receipts of more than $100,000 from sales to 
South Dakotans or who made more than 200 individual sales to South 
Dakotans in the prior year, whether or not the vendor had a physical 
presence in the state.106 Remote vendors were thus targeted for new 
sales tax collection obligations. 
A handful of those remote vendors—Wayfair, Overstock, and 
Newegg.com—refused to comply with the South Dakota law and 
challenged its constitutionality.107 The South Dakota courts agreed 
with the remote vendors,108 and the South Dakota Department of 
Revenue offered little resistance.109 Instead, the Department focused 
its efforts on convincing the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the long 
standing physical presence rule.110 Thus, the briefings and decisions 
along the way to the Supreme Court were narrowly focused on whether 
South Dakota’s law unconstitutionally imposed tax on people lacking 
                                                 
103 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2018). 
104 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Kennedy was far from alone in his critique of the physical 
presence rule. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 331-39 (critiquing the physical 
presence rule’s ability to target undue burdens on interstate commerce); Pomp, supra 
note 18, at 1145-46; Swain, supra note 21, at 361-64. 
105 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2; see S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-1 (providing 
legislative findings regarding the need to enact a law disregarding the physical 
presence rule including “the general growth of online retail” eroding the state’s sales 
tax base and “the [falling] costs of [use tax] collection . . . [g]iven modern computing 
and software options,” as well as noting that the “argument [for requiring remote 
sellers to collect use taxes] has grown stronger, and the cause more urgent, with 
time,” given these findings). 
106 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2. 
107 See State v. Wayfair, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D.S.D. 2017). 
108 State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 760-61 (S.D. 2017) (holding S.D. 
Codified Laws § 10-64-2 unconstitutional). 
109 Id. at 760 (“The State filed a response to the motion for summary judgement 
agreeing with Sellers’ statement of material facts. The State further agreed that the 
court would have to grant Sellers’ motion for summary judgment based upon Bellas 
Hess and Quill and indicated its intention to pursue review of the issue by the United 
States Supreme Court.”). 
110 Id. 
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personal nexus with the state. To win, the state needed to prove that 
anyone falling under its statute had personal nexus with the state. 
Although the state achieved its narrow goal and the Supreme Court 
discarded the physical presence rule,111 the Wayfair decision left the 
personal nexus doctrine (and the greater substantial nexus doctrine) in 
a vague state.112 Narrowly read, Wayfair stands only for the 
proposition that a taxpayer’s physical presence is not necessary to 
establish personal nexus with the taxing state.113 Broader readings hint 
at how the Court views the role of both aspects of the substantial nexus 
requirement more generally but do not provide clarity.114 
After abandoning the physical presence rule, the Wayfair Court 
proclaimed that personal nexus “is established when the taxpayer [or 
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business’ in that jurisdiction,”115 echoing the due process personal 
jurisdiction standard.116 For this proposition, the Court only cited to 
dicta from Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,117 which was not 
decided on dormant Commerce Clause grounds and in any event 
involved oil tankers that were physically present in the taxing 
jurisdiction.118 Polar Tankers provides little guidance for determining 
when personal nexus exists if the taxpayer is not physically present in 
the taxing state. 
The Wayfair Court might have expanded on this “substantial 
privilege” standard when deciding that Wayfair had satisfied it, but the 
Court only offered the following explanation: 
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the 
economic and virtual contacts respondents have with 
the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver 
more than $100,000 of goods or services into South 
Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions 
for the delivery of goods and services into the State on 
                                                 
111 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
112 See authorities cited supra note 16. 
113 See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Substantial Nexus, supra note 16, at 
447 (“The Court’s ruling was very narrow, though, holding only that the physical 
presence rule is no longer the governing standard for purposes of determining when 
a taxpayer has the substantial nexus required under the Court’s Complete Auto 
Transit Inc. v. Brady formulation.”). 
114 Id. at 448. 
115 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
116 The reference to the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” in the 
taxing jurisdiction had been used by the Supreme Court in the state tax jurisprudence 
before Wayfair, but only in discussions of due process limitations on state tax actions. 
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980); Wisconsin 
v. JC Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940). 
117 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009). 
118 See Pomp, supra note 16, at 29; Fatale, supra note 16, at 868. 
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an annual basis. This quantity of business could not 
have occurred unless the seller availed itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business in South 
Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies 
that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of 
Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.119 
Rather than explain what it means to avail oneself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in a jurisdiction, the Court simply 
declared that Wayfair had done so because of the quantity of its 
business with South Dakotans and the size and national scope of its 
business. The Court may be correct, but how should smaller vendors 
read this opinion? What if Wayfair sold only one $150,000 piece of 
furniture to a South Dakotan? Or what if Wayfair sold $1.00 trinkets 
to 200 separate South Dakotans? The Wayfair opinion did not 
adequately answer these questions because it failed to articulate a 
meaning behind the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” 
phrase in the dormant Commerce Clause context.120 
However, Wayfair did not leave the personal nexus standard and 
the substantial nexus doctrine totally rudderless. The Wayfair Court 
invoked dormant Commerce Clause concerns when it clarified that 
compliance costs weigh heavily in the substantial nexus analysis: 
The Quill majority expressed concern that without the 
physical presence rule “a state tax might unduly burden 
interstate commerce” by subjecting retailers to tax 
collection obligations in thousands of different taxing 
jurisdictions. But the administrative costs of 
compliance, especially in the modern economy with its 
Internet technology, are largely unrelated to whether a 
company happens to have a physical presence in a 
State. . . . In other words, under Quill, a small company 
with diverse physical presence might be equally or 
more burdened by compliance costs than a large remote 
seller. The physical presence rule is a poor proxy for 
                                                 
119 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
120 See Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 16, at 130 (“Post-Wayfair, the new 
substantial nexus test turns on whether a taxpayer has availed itself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in the taxing jurisdiction at issue. In keeping with 
tradition, the Court left the minimum threshold of this sufficiency test undefined, for 
lower courts to determine. Because the substantial nexus analysis is fact-specific, the 
only existing guidance for determining the sufficiency of the economic and virtual 
contacts that satisfy this test are the particular South Dakota contacts of the 
businesses involved in the Wayfair litigation.”). 
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the compliance costs faced by companies that do 
business in multiple States.121 
The Court further homed in on its concern with tax compliance costs 
by raising, with seeming approval, various aspects of the South Dakota 
law: the thresholds protected small sellers, retroactive application of 
the law was forbidden, and South Dakota was a member of the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,122 which meant that the 
state’s sales tax system had been simplified by adopting common 
statutory language and administrative practices with other member 
states.123 
Even so, the Court raised those aspects after claiming that “[t]he 
question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s 
Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. . . . That said, 
South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear 
designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon 
interstate commerce.”124 Although the Wayfair Court was clearly 
concerned with the compliance burdens placed on interstate taxpayers, 
the Court failed to tie those concerns directly to its due-process-esque 
personal nexus standard. Wayfair implied a need for the dormant 
Commerce Clause personal nexus inquiry while simultaneously 
seeming to collapse the personal nexus standard into a due process 
standard which does not target that need. 
2. A Lack of Transactional Nexus 
For all the disruption it brought to the personal nexus doctrine, 
Wayfair did little with respect to the transactional nexus doctrine. As 
noted, the decision and the parties focused on the personal nexus issue. 
However, the South Dakota law at issue in Wayfair required out-of-
state vendors to collect tax on sales to South Dakota residents.125 
Under Dilworth, South Dakota likely lacks transactional nexus with 
those sales and thus has no jurisdiction over them, regardless of its 
                                                 
121 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (internal citations omitted). 
122 Id. at 2099-2100. 
123 See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board, About Us, 
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/about-us/about-sstgb; see also Wayfair, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2099-2100. 
124 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
125 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
any seller . . . shall remit the sales tax . . . .”) (emphasis added); see Richard D. Pomp, 
Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 58 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y __ 
(forthcoming 2019); Hayes R. Holderness & Matthew C. Boch, Did South Dakota 
Neglect Transactional Nexus in Its Bill to Kill Quill?, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX 
MANAGEMENT WEEKLY STATE TAX REPORT (Dec. 6, 2017).] 
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jurisdiction over the vendors themselves.126 Thus, a transactional 
nexus issue lurked behind the Wayfair litigation.127 
The parties to the Wayfair litigation did not raise the lurking 
transactional nexus issue,128 and the Court effectively ignored the issue 
by claiming without support that “[a]ll concede that taxing the sales in 
question here is lawful”129 and “[a]ll agree that South Dakota has the 
authority to tax these transactions.”130 While it is true that the use of 
the sold products would be taxable, the sales themselves should not be. 
This lack of attention to the transactional nexus issue is concerning— 
the issue threatened to immunize those out-of-state sales from taxation 
by South Dakota131—and open to interpretation. 
A broad reading of Wayfair in this context may indicate that the 
formalism of past jurisprudence is a bygone relic. The Court’s 
description of everyone as agreeing that the sales were taxable and 
cavalierly referring to both sales and use taxes as sales taxes 
throughout the opinion both suggest that the Court viewed sales and 
use taxes as equivalent taxes,132 at least in the context of the personal 
nexus discussion. As personal nexus is not concerned with the activity 
taxed, but rather with the taxpayer, this equivalence should be 
uncontroversial—the potential taxpayers of both taxes are the 
consumer and the vendor.133 The Court’s failure to go further and 
distinguish the taxes on transactional nexus grounds might be viewed 
as a repudiation of the Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy.134 
On the other hand, a more conservative reading of the Wayfair 
decision indicates that the case is properly viewed solely as a personal 
                                                 
126 See supra note 73; see also Holderness & Boch, supra note 125 (“By limiting 
the scope of the new economic nexus rule to sales taxes, South Dakota has put up an 
additional hurdle in the way of the victory it desires. The state may find that even if 
it wins on the physical presence issue, it will remain unable to tax the proceeds from 
sales of products delivered into the state by common carrier, and additional 
legislation will be necessary.”). 
127 See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125; Pomp, supra note 125; Thimmesch, 
Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 975-76. 
128 See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, 
at 976. 
129 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087. 
130 Id. at 2092. 
131 Thus, there being no taxable transactions to collect tax on, Wayfair would 
have no actual tax collection obligation. See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125. 
132 See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, see also Thimmesch, Shanske, & 
Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 976. 
133 Holderness, supra note 18, at 320-21 (describing sales tax and use tax 
collection regimes); Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra 
note 16, at 976 (“Read in its entirety, Wayfair suggests that the Court viewed the 
difference in the taxes as a difference in who remits them—sales taxes being 
collected and remitted by vendors and use taxes being paid directly by consumers.”). 
134 See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, 
at 976 (considering, through rejecting, this implied repudiation of the 
Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy). 
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nexus case, leaving intact the transactional nexus jurisprudence and 
the Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy.135 The parties did not 
raise or brief the transactional nexus issue, and the Court did not raise 
it sua sponte during any of the proceedings.136 The issue is not directly 
mentioned in the decision.137 Referring to use taxes as sales taxes is a 
common colloquial practice.138 Lower court decisions have continued 
to rely on the historical transactional nexus doctrine,139 and Wayfair’s 
indirect references to any transactional nexus issues in the case do not 
engage with that historical doctrine. As with the personal nexus 
doctrine, Wayfair leaves the transactional nexus doctrine in a vague 
state: does it remain controlled by formalistic distinctions, or has a 
more substantive analysis been allowed to creep in?140 The operation 
of South Dakota’s law and taxpayer certainty depend on the answer to 
this question. 
3. The Wayfair Crossroads 
By shaking the traditional personal nexus analysis apart and failing 
to address transactional nexus concerns, the Wayfair case leaves the 
substantial nexus doctrine at a crossroads. Wayfair’s personal nexus 
standard is vague and reminiscent of the due process personal 
jurisdiction standard and does not clearly address the Court’s concern 
for the burden that compliance costs associated with state taxes might 
impose on interstate commerce.141 Likewise, the Court’s casual 
dismissal of any transactional nexus concerns lurking in the case 
                                                 
135 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (“The Court granted certiorari here to 
reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those 
cases.”); see also Holderness & Boch, supra note 125; Thimmesch, Shanske, & 
Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 976; Gamage & Heckman, supra 
note 21, at 490. 
136 See supra note 128. 
137 See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080. 
138 See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, 
at 976 (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion explicitly noted that the South 
Dakota statute imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but the reference seems to 
have been more colloquial than technical.”); Andrew J. Haile, Sales Tax 
Exceptionalism, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 136, 141 n. 12 (2013); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN 
& WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.01 (3rd ed.) (observing that the 
term “sales tax” is often used to describe a large variety of taxes, including the use 
tax). 
139 See supra note 101. 
140 See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125 (“If certiorari is granted, though, the 
transactional nexus problem would be an opportunity for the Court to revisit and 
refresh its relatively dated transactional nexus jurisprudence.”). 
141 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099-2100 (approving the South Dakota law and 
describing how it eased compliance burdens on taxpayers); see also Wayfair, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2093 (“The Quill majority expressed concern that without the physical 
presence rule ‘a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce’ by subjecting 
retailers to tax collection obligations in thousands of different taxing jurisdictions. 
But the administrative costs of compliance, especially in the modern economy with 
its Internet technology, are largely unrelated to whether a company happens to have 
a physical presence in a State.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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leaves the traditional formalistic transactional nexus standard in doubt. 
By avoiding the transactional nexus issues, the Court also passed up 
an opportunity to clarify the relationship between the personal and 
transactional nexus aspects going forward. 
As a result of all this vagueness and uncertainty, courts, states, and 
taxpayers will have to navigate the crossroads at which Wayfair has 
placed the substantial nexus doctrine. The dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard could remain vague and collapse into the due process 
personal jurisdiction standard or it could strengthen into a coherent 
standard that protects interstate commerce in earnest from unduly 
burdensome state tax actions. The former path could lead to uncertain 
and burdensome tax obligations for interstate taxpayers, counselling in 
favor of the latter path. As the next Part explains, a threshold nexus 
requirement has the unique ability to support the United States’ system 
of interstate commerce by protecting against unduly burdensome tax 
compliance costs. Failing to realize this ability would leave interstate 
commerce exposed to harmful state taxes; to avoid this possibility, the 
next Part guides the substantial nexus doctrine towards a coherent 
standard by developing the compliance burden theory of dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus and the standard that follows from that 
theory. 
II. SOUND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS 
As the discussion in Part I indicates, the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s substantial nexus requirement has generated much 
controversy and confusion over the course of its existence. Much of 
the controversy stems from the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a 
clear purpose for the requirement,142 leaving people to question the 
role it has in preventing state tax actions from placing undue burdens 
on interstate commerce. Indeed, many commentators have questioned 
whether the nexus concept has any role to play in the dormant 
Commerce Clause context, or whether nexus is more appropriately 
considered only in the due process personal jurisdiction context.143  
This Part develops a theory—the compliance burden theory—that 
explains why nexus does have an important role to play in the dormant 
Commerce Clause context. To develop the compliance burden theory, 
this Part considers the types of burdens a state tax might impose on 
interstate commerce and the ability of a threshold nexus requirement 
to address those burdens. As the analysis demonstrates, such a 
                                                 
142 See supra Part I. But see supra note 18 (observing that commentators have 
proposed theoretical justifications for the substantial nexus requirement). 
143 See authorities cited supra note 44. 
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requirement is uniquely situated to protect interstate commerce from 
undue burdens from tax compliance costs.144 
This Part then develops a coherent dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard by relying on the compliance burden theory. This 
standard focuses on whether tax compliance costs would compel 
someone engaged in interstate commerce to avoid doing business in 
the taxing state. The compliance burden theory and the nexus standard 
that follows demonstrate dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine 
can and should avoid collapsing into due process personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Undue Burdens on 
Interstate Commerce 
One of the more important restraints on state actions, tax or 
otherwise, is the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. As explained by 
the Supreme Court, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exists to 
prevent the “economic Balkanization” of the states by prohibiting state 
actions that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate 
commerce.145 The Court has found that facially discriminatory state 
actions are categorically unconstitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause,146 so the most challenging legal issues arise in 
assessing when a state action that is not facially discriminatory—like 
imposing a general sales tax—nevertheless places an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. Generally, a balancing test—referred to as the 
“Pike balancing test”—is used to address these issues: a state action is 
deemed to unduly burden interstate commerce when the burdens 
placed on interstate commerce outweigh the state’s interest in taking 
the action.147 
However, the Pike balancing test has not found a clear home in the 
state tax jurisprudence despite the Court’s recognition that a tax levied 
on interstate commerce has the potential to unduly burden that 
                                                 
144 See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 497-503 (reaching a similar 
conclusion). 
145 E.g. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089, 2091; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
146 See e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (observing “a 
virtually per se rule of invalidity” for laws that facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce). 
147 The Supreme Court has adopted “a two-tiered approach to analyzing state 
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause.” Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. 
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 467 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). When a regulatory 
measure “has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates 
evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing analysis, looking to “whether the 
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly 
exceeds the local benefits.” Id. at 579 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970)). 
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commerce.148 Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall famously described 
the power to tax as the power to destroy; taken to an extreme, a state 
tax could destroy interstate commerce through death by taxation.149 
The Pike balancing test’s absence from the state tax cases likely is a 
result of the difficulties in quantifying a state’s significant interest150 
in exercising the tax power,151 a power that often has been described 
as fundamental.152 
Deviating from the Pike balancing test, the modern state tax 
doctrine instead relies on the Complete Auto test—derived from the 
1977 Complete Auto case—to guide the analysis of the burden that a 
state tax might impose on interstate commerce in a qualitative 
manner.153 In full, the Complete Auto test requires that a “tax [1] is 
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] 
is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the 
State” before the dormant Commerce Clause is satisfied.154 This 
Article focuses on the nexus concept embedded in the first prong of 
the test, but the other prongs become relevant when analyzing the role 
                                                 
148 E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1992). 
149 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (“That the power to tax 
involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render 
useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one 
government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, 
with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts 
the control, are propositions not to be denied.”). 
150 E.g. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981) 
(“[T]his Court has acknowledged that ‘a State has a significant interest in exacting 
from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state government.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
151 Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 109-10 (articulating the difficulty of measuring 
a state’s interest in imposing taxes); Fatale, supra note 16, at 873-74 (detailing the 
difficulty of applying the Pike balancing test to tax matters). 
152 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas, 520 U.S. 
821, 826 (1997) (“The power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist.”); 
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (referring to taxation as “the 
most basic power of government”); State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 
U.S. 527, 537 (1931) (“The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence 
of the government of the states.”); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930) 
(“The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious necessity of all government, 
not to be restricted by mere legal fictions.”). 
153 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018); see also 
Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 107-08 (“Pike balancing is the Court’s way of 
determining when state regulations, in the parlance of its precedential case, simply 
‘go too far.’ That is where Pike seems to diverge from Complete Auto, because the 
Court does not exercise a similarly broad oversight function in its tax cases. It does 
not strike down state taxes because they are too high or because they result in 
cumulative tax burdens. Rather, states are free to tax as they see fit as long as their 
taxes are nondiscriminatory and are fairly apportioned. The one exception, of course, 
is that states cannot go ‘too far’ in who they impose those burdens on.”). 
154 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).  
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of a threshold nexus requirement in preventing undue burdens on 
interstate commerce. 
B. The Compliance Burden Theory of Dormant Commerce 
Clause Nexus 
Broadly speaking, three aspects of a state tax can create burdens 
on interstate commerce: the tax rate; the tax base; and the tax 
compliance costs. A tax rate that becomes too high, a tax base that is 
incorrectly measured, or tax compliance costs that become too heavy 
might lead to undue burdens. As the following subsections 
demonstrate, the nexus concept—that threshold connection between 
the taxing state and the interstate commerce taxed—offers weak 
protections against potential undue burdens resulting from tax rates 
and tax bases but offers strong protections against such burdens 
resulting from tax compliance costs. Thus, protecting interstate 
commerce from the undue burdens of tax compliance cost should drive 
the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. 
1. The Potential Undue Burdens of Too High Tax Rates 
When thinking of an unduly burdensome tax, one might first 
suspect that the tax rate is too high. However, a high tax rate, if duly-
enacted though a state’s legitimate political process, is not inherently 
problematic, as the Supreme Court has indicated.155 Because a state’s 
interest in exercising its tax power is strong and difficult to quantify, 
it is difficult to apply the traditional Pike balancing test to determine 
                                                 
155 See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994) 
(“Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are generally 
upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate commerce, in part because ‘[t]he 
existence of major in-state interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard 
against legislative abuse.’”). Justice Ginsburg most recently articulated a political 
process argument in a dissent in Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 
S. Ct. 1787, 1814-15 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting): 
Residents, moreover, possess political means, not shared by 
outsiders, to ensure that the power to tax their income is not 
abused. “It is not,” this Court has observed, “a purpose of the 
Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state 
taxes.” The reason is evident. Residents are “insider[s] who 
presumably [are] able to complain about and change the tax 
through the [State's] political process.” Nonresidents, by contrast, 
are not similarly positioned to “effec[t] legislative change.” As 
Chief Justice Marshall, developer of the Court's Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, reasoned: “In imposing a tax the legislature acts 
upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against 
erroneous and oppressive taxation.” The “people of a State” can 
thus “res[t] confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the 
influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard 
them against . . . abuse” of the “right of taxing themselves and their 
property.” 
(internal citations omitted). See also Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 496. 
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whether the tax unduly burdens interstate commerce.156 However, the 
type of balancing that Pike demands—comparing the state’s interest in 
acting with the burden placed on individuals—is unnecessary when the 
tax is self-imposed; the taxpayer-voters have decided that the tax is 
worth imposing, presumptively making the burdens imposed not 
undue.  
Of course, the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with undue 
burdens on interstate commerce. This interstate commerce aspect 
introduces the possibility that the political process may fail to 
accurately balance the state’s interest and the burdens of the state tax; 
the state tax may fall on an out-of-state taxpayer who is not involved 
in the state’s political process and thus not be self-imposed.157 
Alternatively, the interstate income of state residents might be subject 
to higher tax rates than intrastate income.158 Interstate commerce may 
become unduly burdened as a result of either.159 These scenarios are 
not difficult to imagine; for example, Virginians might elect to impose 
a one hundred percent tax rate on the income of Marylanders earned in 
Virginia. Marylanders would presumably stop their Virginia activities 
facing such a tax, and interstate commerce would have been 
impermissibly chilled. Alternatively, Virginians might impose a 
higher tax on income earned by Virginians in Maryland to encourage 
Virginians to work solely in Virginia. 
A threshold nexus requirement could address this problem, though 
not in a completely satisfying manner. A nexus standard could protect 
any interstate taxpayer from a state tax until the taxpayer’s connection 
with the state is large enough that it would be allowed to vote or 
otherwise participate in the political system.160 Once the interstate 
taxpayer has a political voice in the taxing state, the political 
protections against high tax rates could be relied on.  
                                                 
156 See supra note 151. 
157 See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200 (“However, when a 
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, 
a State’s political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, 
because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has 
been mollified by the subsidy.”); see also Zelinsky, supra note 18, at 51 (observing 
that “the temptation to tax nonvoters is politically irresistible”). 
158 See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787. 
159 See id. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has not shied away 
from striking down or closely scrutinizing state efforts to tax residents at a higher 
rate for out-of-state activities than for in-state activities (or to exempt from taxation 
only in-state activities).”). 
160 See Zelinsky, supra note 18, at 3 (“From [a political process] vantage, the 
Commerce Clause concept of tax nexus is best understood as a rough, but 
serviceable, proxy for the taxpayer’s standing in the political process.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314272 
32 
 
Difficulties of articulating such a standard comprehensibly 
aside,161 a major problem for relying on the nexus requirement in this 
way is that the interstate taxpayers’ political voice might not overcome 
that of a majority of intrastate taxpayers, threatening to expose the 
interstate commerce to higher tax rates.162 In the above example, native 
Virginians might easily drown out the political influence of 
Marylanders who have the ability to participate in Virginia’s political 
process. Alternatively, Virginians working solely intrastate could elect 
to tax other Virginians who work interstate at higher rates. Unless the 
dormant Commerce Clause were to require states to afford out-of-
staters or those working out-of-state more political influence than pure 
in-staters—an absurd proposition—a nexus standard based on political 
voice would fail to effectively protect interstate commerce from too 
high tax rates. 
Therefore, to ensure that interstate commerce is appropriately 
protected from unduly high tax rates, the in-state voters should be 
relied on to reach the appropriate balance. This can be done by 
prohibiting interstate commerce from being taxed more heavily than 
intrastate commerce. Such a rule would allow in-state voters to be 
relied on to prevent unduly burdensome tax rates from being imposed 
on both intrastate and interstate commerce,163 regardless of the 
connection the interstate commerce has with the state. Local 
Virginians would be unable to subject Marylanders or interstate 
Virginians to higher taxes than the local Virginians are willing to bear. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the strength of such a non-
discrimination rule in this context and has not sought to impose limits 
on the size of state tax rates on interstate commerce in the modern 
jurisprudence.164 Instead, the third prong of the Complete Auto test has 
been relied on to prevent states from specifically targeting interstate 
commerce for higher tax burdens by forbidding states from treating 
interstate commerce more harshly than intrastate commerce.165 Thus, 
                                                 
161 See id. at 55-59 (addressing the difficulties of a political voice standard for 
substantial nexus). 
162 See id. at 52-53 (discussing the “chief problem with this approach . . . that 
interstate taxpayers’ political remedies do not always protect them from excessive 
tax burdens.”). 
163 See supra note 155. 
164 In historical jurisprudence, all taxes on interstate commerce were forbidden 
at various times. For descriptions of the evolution of the jurisprudence, see Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-84 (1995); Complete Auto 
Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279-87 (1977); see also POMP, supra note 72, at 
1-1 to 1-21. 
165 E.g. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 
(2015) (“Under our precedents, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes States from 
‘discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.’ This 
means, among other things, that a State ‘may not tax a transaction or incident more 
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314272 
33 
 
a threshold nexus standard is not necessary or best suited to address 
the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of too high tax 
rates. 
2. The Potential Undue Burdens of a Distorted Tax Base 
Continuing to think of unduly burdensome taxes, one might next 
suspect that a distorted tax base could create harmful results. Although 
the in-state political process can be relied on to reach a constitutional 
tax rate on interstate commerce, that political process may fail when 
considering the construction of the tax base. The process can ensure 
that the same bases are subject to tax regardless of whether the bases 
are part of intrastate or interstate commerce, but the multijurisdictional 
nature of interstate commerce introduces the complexity that the entire 
tax base may not be connected with the taxing state.  
A state tax might therefore burden interstate commerce by 
attributing more of the interstate tax base commerce to its jurisdiction 
than is appropriate, effectively engaging in the taxation of 
extraterritorial activities.166 This sort of activity represents a potential 
indirect means of taxing interstate commerce more heavily than 
intrastate commerce and thus chilling the interstate commerce. For 
instance, Arizona might impose an income tax which applies to all 
income earned in the state. It is often difficult to source income to only 
one place;167 for example, the income a data hosting service earns 
performing services out of its California office for Arizona clients 
arguably has both California and Arizona sources. If Arizona fully 
included any income that has at least a partial Arizona source in the 
                                                 
166 See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184-85 (“The difficult question in this case 
is whether the tax is properly apportioned within the meaning of the second prong of 
Complete Auto’s test, ‘the central purpose [of which] is to ensure that each State 
taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.’ This principle of fair share is the 
lineal descendant of Western Live Stock’s prohibition of multiple taxation, which is 
threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the possibility 
that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed: the portion of value by 
which one State exceeded its fair share would be taxed again by a State properly 
laying claim to it.’”); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 
159, 170 (1983) (“[W]e will strike down the application of an apportionment formula 
if the taxpayer can prove ‘by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income attributed 
to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted . . 
. in that State,’ or has ‘led to a grossly distorted result.’”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 
437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978) (addressing concerns that Iowa attributed too much of 
an interstate company’s income to the state through the use of a single sales factor 
apportionment formula). 
167 See, e.g., Catherine A. Battin, Maria P. Eberle, & Lindsay M. LaCava, 
Demystifying the Sales Factor: Market-Based Sourcing, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 403, 403 
(2014) (“The key problem faced by most service providers is determining where the 
market for their services is located. Depending on the state, the market may be where 
the benefit of the service is received by the customer, where the service is received, 
where the customer is located, or where the service is delivered. Those varying 
interpretations of the market may produce dramatically different results and create 
complexities and uncertainties.”). 
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state’s income tax base, that tax base would be overstated at the 
expense of interstate commerce.  
A threshold nexus requirement could be used to protect against this 
type of potentially burdensome action but only in a highly ineffective 
manner. The requirement could prevent a state from imposing tax on 
interstate commerce until such time as the interstate taxpayer or 
activity has such a large connection with the state that sourcing any 
amount of the activity taxed to the state would not be unduly 
burdensome. For instance, suppose that there is some tolerable margin 
of error for states in determining their share of the tax base such that 
one state might claim more of the base than it technically should—say 
the claimed tax base must be within ten percentage points of the “true” 
base.168 In such a case, the substantial nexus standard could protect 
against the undue burden of overstated tax bases by preventing a state 
from taxing interstate commerce until at least ninety percent of that 
commerce occurred in the state (assuming the high end of the range of 
acceptable tax bases is one hundred percent of the tax base). 
This solution would be too restrictive on states by effectively 
protecting most interstate commerce from state taxation, a situation the 
Supreme Court has rejected.169 The potential tax base problems are 
better solved through a system of apportionment—requiring the states 
to divide up interstate tax bases—or a system of tax prioritization170—
ranking the authority of the states to impose tax on the interstate 
commerce. Either system could ensure that no more than one hundred 
percent of the interstate commerce is subject to tax; though an 
apportionment system would be more respectful of each individual 
                                                 
168 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184 (observing a deviation of 
“approximately 14%” would not violate the fair apportionment requirement whereas 
a deviation of “more than 250%” would). Query how one would determine the 
appropriate baseline against which to make such a comparison; the Court has not 
provided clear guidance other than to say that using the accounting method of the 
taxpayer will not suffice on its own. Id. at 182-84. 
169 See, e.g., D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1988) 
(“Complete Auto abandoned the abstract notion that interstate commerce ‘itself’ 
cannot be taxed by the States. We recognized that, with certain restrictions, interstate 
commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.”); Colonial Pipeline 
Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975) (“It is a truism that the mere act of carrying 
on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state 
taxation. ‘It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in 
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases 
the cost of doing the business.’”) (internal citations omitted); Northwestern States 
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1959) (“[I]t is axiomatic 
that the founders did not intend to immunize [interstate] commerce from carrying its 
fair share of the costs of the state government in return for the benefits it derives 
from within the State.”). 
170 Justice Rutledge argued as early as 1944 that the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine should be setting such rules of tax priority among the states. See supra note 
82. 
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states’ tax power by not conditioning any one state’s authority on 
another’s. 
Indeed, to address these concerns, the Supreme Court has adopted 
an apportionment system. The second prong of the Complete Auto test 
requires that any state tax on interstate commerce be fairly apportioned 
according to the amount of activity in the state.171 Therefore, in theory, 
a state should be unable to tax one hundred percent of an activity that 
takes place in more than one state; the state will only be allowed to 
impose tax on that portion of the activity that takes place in the state.172 
In this way, interstate commerce that has no connection with the taxing 
state is protected from that state’s tax; the in-state tax base would be 
nothing.173  
A state tax might also burden interstate commerce by measuring 
the tax base by something wholly unrelated to the activities in the 
state,174 another potential indirect means of taxing interstate commerce 
more heavily than intrastate commerce. For example, Colorado could 
impose a “nature tax” on visitors to its state parks for the privilege of 
visiting those parks but measure the tax by the income of the taxpayer, 
which might create a tax inordinately large in relation to the taxpayer’s 
activities in the state.  
A threshold nexus requirement could protect against such harm by 
again requiring that the interstate commerce have such a large 
connection with the state that using any tax base would not be unduly 
burdensome; though such a threshold would likely be too restrictive 
on states.175 Instead, the political process protections discussed earlier 
should prevent the use of this tactic to target out-of-state taxpayers, 
                                                 
171 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (“[W]e will 
sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax . . . [2] is fairly 
apportioned . . . .’”). 
172 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (“The first, and again obvious, 
component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal 
consistency—that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, 
it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”). In 
practice, the constitutional apportionment standards leave a lot of room for state-by-
state interpretation, which has created a web of overlapping and underlapping rules 
that do not perfectly divide the tax base. See Cara Griffeth, The Complexities of 
Apportionment and the Question of Uniformity, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 725 (2010); 
Testimony of John A. Swain, Hearing on State Taxation: The Role of Congress in 
Developing Apportionment Standards, (May 6, 2010), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2010/2010-10148-1.pdf. 
173 The Due Process Clause also meaningfully restricts states’ ability to tax 
things outside of their territories by demanding that there be some minimum 
connection between the taxing state and the thing taxed. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-
08. In this way, the Due Process Clause addresses concerns about extraterritorial 
state taxation. See Holderness, supra note 35, at 402-04 (discussing prohibitions on 
extraterritorial state taxation). 
174 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1981). 
175 See supra note 169. 
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and the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test would 
adequately protect interstate commerce.176 
For its part, the state tax jurisprudence may have recognized the 
ability of the political process to protect against these kinds of distorted 
tax bases. Technically, the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test 
prohibits tax bases that are unrelated to the activity in the state, 
ensuring that the state tax is fairly related to whatever is occurring in 
the state.177 However, the application of this prong is so forgiving to 
states—almost any tax base will be found to be fairly related to 
whatever is occurring in the state—that it effectively passes the 
question to the political process.178 
Thus, a threshold nexus standard is also ill-suited and unnecessary 
to address the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of 
distorted tax bases. 
3. The Potential Undue Burdens of Tax Compliance Costs 
Finally, one might suspect that a tax could become unduly 
burdensome if the costs to comply with the tax were too large. Tax 
compliance costs include things such as the labor required to ensure 
that taxes are correctly paid, the capital investments in software and 
computing capacity to run tax compliance systems, the ability to access 
funds to pay the tax, and—importantly—the costs and risks associated 
with handling audits by state revenue departments.179 Importantly, 
                                                 
176 See supra notes 155-165 and accompanying text. 
177 See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (“[T]he fourth prong 
of the Complete Auto Transit test imposes the additional limitation that the measure 
of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact, since it is the 
activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear 
a ‘just share of state tax burden.’”). 
178 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) 
(“The fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed accounting of the 
services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being taxed, nor, indeed, 
is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity. If the 
event is taxable, the proceeds from the tax may ordinarily be used for purposes 
unrelated to the taxable event.”); see also Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. 
Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the 
Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 196, 206 
(2007) (“Courts have heretofore been so reluctant to . . . apply the ‘fairly related’ 
prong of Complete Auto [that it] has become a dead letter.”) (comments of Brannon 
P. Denning). 
179 See GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters: Sales Taxes: States Could 
Gain Revenue From Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience 
Compliance Costs, *15-27 (detailing compliance costs for sales and use tax 
collection) (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter, GAO Report]; Holderness, supra note 18, at 
331; Ralph B. Tower, Back to the Future? The Post-Wayfair Consumer Use Tax, 89 
ST. TAX NOTES 879 (2018) (detailing the challenges of use tax compliance under 
different regimes). The costs of addressing the risk of inadvertent non-compliance 
and addressing potential non-compliance on audit tend to multiply the otherwise 
relatively straightforward compliance costs. See GAO Report, supra, at *20-27; 
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compliance costs tend to be relatively flat; they are roughly as 
burdensome on the first bit of activity taxed as they are on the last.180 
As an example of how these costs might unduly burden interstate 
commerce, suppose it costs a New York vendor $475 for compliance 
software that enables it to correctly collect and remit Massachusetts 
sales tax. If the New York vendor makes only $50 per sale into 
Massachusetts, it would presumably forgo making any sales into the 
state until it makes at least ten and makes enough profit to cover its 
compliance costs. The compliance costs would chill the taxpayer’s 
interstate commerce until its activity in the state is profitable enough 
to cover them. Here, a threshold nexus requirement shines and other 
dormant Commerce Clause guardrails falter. 
A threshold nexus requirement can protect against the potential 
undue burden of tax compliance costs on interstate commerce by 
ensuring that a state cannot impose tax (and the associated compliance 
costs) until the commerce has enough of a connection with the state 
such that the benefit of that connection to the taxpayer outweighs the 
burden of the compliance costs. In short, a nexus with the taxing state 
would not exist until the interstate taxpayer has made enough money 
to cover the compliance costs of the state tax system. In the above 
example, the nexus requirement could protect the New York vendor’s 
first nine sales from Massachusetts sales tax. In this way, the nexus 
requirement can ensure that interstate commerce is not exposed to 
unduly burdensome tax compliance costs; costs that would chill the 
interstate commerce. 
Because of the flat nature of compliance costs,181 other dormant 
Commerce Clause protections are ill-suited to address the burden of 
                                                 
Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 510 (“[C]ompensation for compliance costs 
must include compensation for intangible costs such as executives’ time and the risk 
of being subject to penalties for inadvertent noncompliance.”); Julia S. Bragg & 
Robert J. Tuinstra, Jr., Managing State and Local Tax Risks, 57 ST. TAX NOTES 361 
(2010) (detailing the various risks for taxpayers associated with state and local tax 
compliance). 
180 See Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, An Analysis of Internet Sales Taxation 
and the Small Seller Exemption, at *35-36 (Small Business Administration, Nov. 
2013) (surveying studies of compliance costs and observing that “These findings 
indicate that there may be some economies of scale in terms of compliance costs, 
echoing Bradford’s (2004) survey of the literature. As Bradford notes, however, the 
apparent economies of scale may be based on the relatively fixed nature of 
compliance costs”); see also Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 111 (“[A] firm’s costs 
will likely be highest in its first year of operating in a state, but they should be 
reduced thereafter. A firm utilizing software to manage many of these burdens might 
find their costs to be more stable.”); Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 504-09 
(analyzing hypothetical tax compliance costs based on reports of compliance costs 
and observing that costs are “much higher as a percentage of sales for small vendors 
than for large vendors,” demonstrating that such costs rise more slowly than the 
benefits of sales activity); see also GAO Report, supra note 179, at *15-27. 
181 See supra note 180. 
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tax compliance costs because they focus on the structure and scope of 
the tax itself. An apportionment system would technically assign a 
small portion of interstate activity to a state if there is only a tiny 
amount of the activity occurring in the state, which would require the 
taxpayer to bear full compliance costs to pay a small amount of tax. 
Those costs cannot be apportioned like the tax base; they must be 
borne in full by someone. The anti-discrimination principle requires 
only that the state not treat interstate commerce more harshly than 
intrastate commerce. If a state chooses, though its political system, to 
impose taxes with high compliance costs on intrastate commerce, then 
the prong would not prevent the imposition of those same costs on 
interstate commerce.182 Thus, a threshold nexus requirement is 
uniquely situated to address the potential burden of tax compliance 
costs on interstate commerce. 
4. The Compliance Burden Theory and Cumulative Tax 
Burdens 
The above analysis leads to the compliance burden theory of 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus: the nexus requirement should exist 
to prevent unduly burdensome tax compliance costs from being placed 
on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
offered this justification for its articulated “substantial nexus” 
requirement, but as discussed, its decisions addressing the personal 
nexus requirement have threads of concerns about tax compliance 
costs.183 For example, in Wayfair, the Court discussed how the 
physical presence rule failed to protect small vendors from 
burdensome “administrative costs of compliance.”184 
Recognizing that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
requirement is uniquely situated to protect against unduly burdensome 
tax compliance costs raises an important question: should each state’s 
tax compliance costs be considered in isolation, or should the nexus 
requirement focus on the cumulative compliance costs borne by a 
multistate taxpayer?185 Because the dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence exists to prevent individual states from acting to unduly 
burden interstate commerce, it is not adequately equipped to address 
                                                 
182 The anti-discrimination prong does not work in reverse; it does not demand 
that intrastate commerce be treated the same as interstate commerce. Intrastate 
commerce is the sole domain of the taxing state, and federal law will not upset the 
state’s rules for intrastate commerce in this context. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 
252, 266 (1989) (“It is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state 
residents from their own state taxes.”).  
183 See supra Part I.A.1. 
184 See supra note 121. 
185 This question has long lingered in the substantial nexus area. For example, in 
their pre-Wayfair analysis of the substantial nexus requirement, Gamage and 
Heckman considered the burdens on interstate commerce created by aggregate tax 
compliance costs from multiple jurisdictions See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 
21, at 500-01.  
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the cumulative effects of all states’ actions. Addressing those 
cumulative effects instead demands political balancing and tradeoffs 
that Congress has been tasked with under its Commerce Clause 
authority.186 Simply put, in the absence of Congressional action, 
individual states’ interests in exercising their tax powers over interstate 
commerce are not dependent on what other states do. As such, the 
compliance costs of each tax regime must be viewed in isolation. 
The state taxation jurisprudence has implicitly recognized this 
conclusion. The Supreme Court has been loath to invalidate one state’s 
tax action under the dormant Commerce Clause when an interstate 
taxpayer suffers from alleged undue burdens from the cumulation of 
many states’ tax regimes; instead, the court has demanded clear proof 
that the challenged tax regime, not the other states’, is the actual source 
of the undue burdens, a nearly impossible task in practice.187 
Additionally, the Quill Court failed to adopt Justice Rutledge’s 
position that the dormant Commerce Clause should be setting rules of 
tax priority between taxing states that have due process nexus with the 
interstate commerce taxed, despite the fact that the Court adopted 
Justice Rutledge’s suggested split of the Due Process Clause and 
dormant Commerce Clause analyses of state tax actions. Setting rules 
of tax priority would have accounted for cumulative tax burdens; 
instead, the Quill Court left the issue in Congress’ hands.188 Until 
Congress says otherwise, each individual state’s tax power is not 
dependent on any other state’s actions. 
It is true that Quill and Bellas Hess both expressed concern about 
the potential of cumulative tax burdens on interstate taxpayers to 
support the use of the physical presence rule for personal nexus.189 
However, Wayfair should be read to dismiss those concerns in its focus 
                                                 
186 See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 
(1967) (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national 
economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, 
this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”). 
187 See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192-93 
(1983) (“If California’s method of formula apportionment ‘inevitably’ led to double 
taxation, that might be reason enough to render it suspect. But since it does not, it 
would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require 
California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation 
in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double 
taxation.”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978) (refusing to 
hold Iowa’s apportionment formula unconstitutional because it differed from other 
states’ formulas and may have contributed to cumulative tax burdens on interstate 
commerce). 
188 Cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (“[The Commerce 
Clause] aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is 
not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that 
Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens 
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with 
our conclusions.”). 
189 See supra notes 58 and 64. 
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on the taxpayer’s connection with the taxing jurisdiction alone. Indeed, 
the Wayfair Court specifically addressed those concerns and claimed 
that “[o]ther aspects of the Court’s doctrine can better and more 
accurately address any potential [cumulative] burdens on interstate 
commerce, whether or not Quill’s physical presence rule is 
satisfied.”190  
Although the Court did not expand on what those other aspects 
might be, to the extent the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
does anything to address cumulative tax burdens on interstate 
commerce, it does so mainly through the apportionment prong of the 
Complete Auto test.191 In theory, apportionment ensures that no 
cumulative tax burdens exist on interstate commerce by preventing 
states from taxing any more than their fair share of the multistate tax 
base.192 Therefore, the potential impact of cumulative tax burdens on 
interstate commerce is properly addressed after dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus exists—after the tax compliance costs imposed by the 
taxing state are not unduly burdensome on interstate commerce. 
In sum, the compliance burden theory holds that a threshold nexus 
inquiry for state tax power is appropriate under the dormant Commerce 
Clause because such an inquiry is uniquely capable of protecting 
interstate commerce from the undue burdens of state tax compliance 
costs. The theory focuses on individual state tax burdens; it is not 
concerned with the cumulative tax compliance costs that a multistate 
taxpayer might be subjected to. Relying on these conclusions, the next 
section develops a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard. 
C. A Theoretically-Sound Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus 
Standard 
Understanding the compliance burden theory allows for the 
development of a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard. The nexus standard must take the costs associated with 
tax compliance into account, as well as the benefits the taxpayer 
receives from engaging in interstate commerce in the taxing state. This 
                                                 
190 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018). 
191 See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.. 
192 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (the 
apportionment standard looks “to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that 
portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State. 
Here, the threat of real multiple taxation (though not by literally identical statutes) 
may indicate a State’s impermissible overreaching.”) (internal citations omitted); 
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (“The first, and again obvious, component of 
fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency—
that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result 
in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”). 
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standard taps into many of the concerns expressed by the Wayfair 
Court and ensures that those concerns drive the nexus analysis.  
1. A Post-Wayfair Nexus Standard  
The fundamental nature of the state tax power indicates that the 
states should have a strong interest in efficient and effective tax 
administration,193 which may demand that taxpayers bear many of the 
costs of tax compliance. However, imposing those costs on interstate 
commerce threatens to inappropriately chill that commerce.194 
Therefore, the standard for dormant Commerce Clause nexus should 
follow the greater dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and engage in 
balancing similar to the Pike balancing test to determine when the 
state’s interest in imposing tax compliance costs on interstate 
commerce is unduly burdensome on that commerce.195 Traditional 
Pike balancing may be difficult in the case of evaluating the state tax 
burden itself,196 but the balancing becomes more straightforward when 
examining the tax compliance costs. 
The nexus standard that follows from the compliance burden 
theory provides that dormant Commerce Clause nexus exists when the 
benefits the taxpayer receives from conducting interstate commerce in 
the state exceed the tax compliance costs imposed on the taxpayer. 
Simply put, if the interstate commerce is profitable despite the tax 
compliance costs,197 then the nexus standard should be satisfied. If not, 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus should not be found. This standard 
can be expressed formulaically as: 
Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus ⇔ Benefit to Taxpayer of Activity 
in State > Taxpayer Compliance Costs 
This standard sends a clear message to states that compliance costs 
are important. That said, the standard should not be terribly imposing 
on states. Reasonable minds can disagree on how much the benefit to 
the taxpayer should exceed the tax compliance costs, but at a minimum 
that benefit should equal the costs to avoid the complete interruption 
of interstate commerce. In any event, because tax compliance costs are 
                                                 
193 See supra note 152. 
194 See supra Part II.A.3. 
195 See supra note 147. 
196 See supra note 153. 
197 As Gamage and Heckman observed before the Wayfair case, “[b]eing exempt 
from state sales and use taxes is sufficiently important to major e-commerce vendors 
such as Amazon that these vendors can be expected to end most affiliations that 
would deem them to have a physical presence within key customer states.” Gamage 
& Heckman, supra note 21, at 485. This observation recognizes that remote vendors 
were offered a significant competitive advantage over local vendors under the 
physical presence rule regime. The proposal in this Article would only permit remote 
vendors to avoid tax collection when the costs of doing so would be prohibitively 
expensive for the taxpayer. 
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relatively flat costs to the taxpayer, dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
concerns should quickly fade away as the interstate taxpayer increases 
its beneficial activities in the state. 
The proposed nexus standard does not separate out personal nexus 
and transactional nexus concerns, at least not directly. Instead, it 
focuses on the compliance costs placed on the taxpayer as they relate 
to the interstate activity in the taxing state. The reason for this approach 
is that the two concerns become significantly intertwined under the 
compliance burden theory. The burden of tax compliance costs must 
fall to a taxpayer, so personal nexus may seem the more relevant 
concern. If the taxpayer’s presence in the state is not beneficial enough 
to justify taking on the burden of those costs, dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus does not exist.  
However, the relevant presence of the taxpayer is based on the 
activities being conducted in and taxed by the state. Transactional 
nexus turns out to be the most pertinent concern because the tax 
compliance costs are specific to the activity taxed. If those compliance 
costs would drive the taxpayer to stop that activity in the state, dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus is not established. Because of the prominence 
of the transactional nexus aspect under the compliance burden theory, 
a coherent dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard can develop in 
the jurisprudence even if the standard for personal nexus remains 
vague or collapses into the due process personal jurisdiction 
standard.198 All that is needed is the development of the transactional 
nexus standard in line with the proposed standard. 
In short, a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard must consider the specific interstate activity taxed and how 
tax compliance costs burden that activity. Personal nexus should exist 
when transactional nexus exists, and even if other activities could 
establish personal nexus,199 transactional nexus requires that each 
                                                 
198 Cf. Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 116 (“The Court’s best option in Wayfair 
is to repeal the physical-presence rule and to not replace it.”). Many commentators 
have argued that it would be appropriate for the personal nexus standard to collapse 
into the due process nexus standard. See authorities cited supra note 44. 
199 Certain case law indicates that the personal nexus and transactional nexus 
inquiries may be totally separate from each other. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. 
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 561 (1977) (“[T]he relevant 
constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-state seller 
to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax relates to 
the seller’s activities carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts 
demonstrate “some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and] 
the person . . . it seeks to tax.”). If personal nexus continues to evolve as a separate 
line of doctrine from transactional nexus, then it would be possible for a taxpayer to 
have nexus with the state but for the activity taxed not to have a connection with the 
state. For example, an online bookseller could have its headquarters in Washington 
State, establishing personal nexus, yet the transactional nexus doctrine would prevent 
Washington State from taxing the bookseller’s sales made at its retail store in New 
York. 
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activity taxed be analyzed separately. The Court was correct to frame 
the first prong of the Complete Auto test in terms of transactional 
nexus,200 and the Quill Court’s focus on personal nexus was 
unnecessary.201 
2. Assessing the Proposed Nexus Standard 
In addition to fulfilling the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause 
by protecting interstate commerce from unduly burdensome tax 
compliance costs, the proposed nexus standard would prove beneficial 
in a number of ways. First, by using a more focused dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus standard, the analysis of state tax jurisdiction 
can appropriately adapt to changing economies, business practices, 
and tax systems. For example, if interstate services are more profitable 
than interstate sales of consumer goods, then a smaller connection with 
the services would be necessary to overcome the burden of tax 
compliance costs. If businesses become more adept at complying with 
complex tax systems, again a smaller connection with taxing states 
would be necessary. As tax systems simplify, their compliance costs 
fall, also requiring smaller connections.  
Second, the proposed standard would allow states the flexibility to 
expand their tax jurisdiction by absorbing the compliance costs of their 
tax systems.202 The idea of states absorbing the compliance costs of 
their tax systems may seem fanciful at first glance, but states already 
do this to varying degrees. For example, many states provide “vendor 
discounts” to vendors that collect sales and use taxes, whereby the 
vendor is permitted to retain a percentage of the taxes collected in 
order to offset the administrative burden of collecting and remitting.203 
Additionally, member states of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement provide free compliance software to certain vendors.204 
                                                 
200 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (laying out the 
Complete Auto test as “we will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge 
so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the 
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’”) (emphasis 
added). 
201 Cf. Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. 
TAX REV. 157, 188-91 (2012) (discussing the “gratuitous elevation of the Commerce 
Clause over the Due Process Clause”). 
202 Pre-Wayfair, Gamage and Heckman proposed allowing states to move past 
the physical presence rule if they fully absorbed the compliance costs of their tax 
systems. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 503-12. 
203 For a list of states providing vendor discounts, see Federation of Tax 
Administrators, Sales Tax Rates and Vendor Discounts (Jan. 2019), available at 
https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/vendors.pdf. 
204 See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board, Certified Service 
Providers About, https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/certified-service-
providers/certified-service-providers-about. 
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Third, the proposed nexus standard would also bring the tax 
jurisprudence more in line with other areas of dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence,205 reducing variation between different areas of 
law.206 Outside of the state tax arena, the Pike balancing test is used to 
resolve conflicts between states and multijurisdictional people and 
activities.207 Although the Pike balancing test is highly deferential in 
practice to states,208 it seeks to balance the costs imposed by the state 
on interstate commerce against the state’s interest in acting,209 as 
would the proposed dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard.210 
This is not to claim that finding that balance will not present 
challenges. If there was value to the physical presence rule, it was the 
value that comes with generally applicable bright-line rules; they are 
typically easier to apply that more fluid standards.211 A primary 
criticism of the proposed nexus standard might be that it would require 
intensive evidence gathering and complicated calculations to 
determine when tax compliance costs become too burdensome.212 
Indeed, some commentators argue that the application of a balancing 
                                                 
205 See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 91 
TEMPLE L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the state tax dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is well on its way to convening with the non-tax 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and that that coming together should be 
formally completed). 
206 See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 116, 120-21; Hayes Holderness, The 
Workability of Pike Balancing for State and Local Tax Collection Obligations, The 
Surly Subgroup (Apr. 4, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/W752-J4AE; but see 
Fatale, supra note 16, at 872 (claiming that “the Court has been retreating from Pike 
for several decades, even in the regulatory context from which that standard 
derives.”); Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 16, at 292 (“[I]t has been argued that 
the Court has implicitly repudiated a Pike balancing analysis in dormant commerce 
clause cases . . . .”). 
207 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090-91 (2018). 
208 See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 108 (“The Court has not struck down a 
state statute applying [Pike] balancing since the 1980s. The Roberts Court has 
generally been unwilling to even engage in balancing.”); Hellerstein & Appleby, 
supra note 16, at 292. 
209 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 467 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986) (observing that when a regulatory measure “has only indirect effects 
on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing 
analysis, looking to “whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden 
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”) (citing Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
210 Thimmesch argues that the substantial nexus concept generally should be 
understood to serve the same function as Pike balancing. See Thimmesch, supra note 
21, at 106-08 
211 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (“Like other 
bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges. . . . This 
artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule 
firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to 
collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.”). 
212 See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 109-12 (discussing the difficulties of a 
balancing test as a substantial nexus standard); Fatale, supra note 16, at 873-74 
(detailing the difficulty of applying the Pike balancing test to tax matters). 
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test in this context is prohibitively difficult.213 However, these 
arguments are based on the difficulty of sorting out the cumulative 
burdens that tax compliance costs from multiple jurisdictions might 
place on interstate commerce; admittedly, teasing out each 
jurisdiction’s contribution to the cumulative burden would be a 
prohibitively difficult task.214 
As discussed though, the compliance burden theory instructs that 
the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard must focus on the 
compliance costs imposed by each taxing jurisdiction in isolation, not 
in aggregate.215 This focus simplifies the balancing analysis: 
compliance costs and taxpayer benefits are easier to calculate when 
only considering one taxing jurisdiction at a time. Taxpayers should 
be able to show fairly accurately their anticipated costs of compliance 
with the individual state tax regime and the expected profitability of 
their activities in the taxing state. 
Even so, as a practical matter, the proposed standard would likely 
lead to lawmakers and taxpayers resorting to proxies such as the 
average profit margin of the particular activity taxed to simplify the 
analysis, forsaking a truly pure application of the standard.216 Such 
proxies would provide clarity and simplicity generally, and the 
standard would serve as a safety valve for seriously aggrieved 
taxpayers wishing to bring individual challenges to nexus 
determinations.  
Such challenges could be costly for states and taxpayers, but 
should be rare. Given the low hurdle the proposed nexus standard 
should present, taxpayers should only raise challenges when they have 
                                                 
213 See, e.g., Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 512-13. In Gamage and 
Heckman’s view, the solution to the difficulty of balancing in this context is to only 
find substantial nexus in those taxing jurisdictions that fully absorb the tax 
compliance costs imposed on interstate commerce. Id. at 506-07, 513. 
214 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra Part II.B.4. 
216 These sorts of administrative shortcuts are common in state and local tax 
jurisprudence, as the cost of arriving at absolutely accurate measures is often 
prohibitive. For example, the apportionment formulas states use to meet the fair 
apportionment requirement of the Complete Auto test are recognized not to be 
absolutely accurate; instead the formulas rely on measures like a taxpayer’s property, 
payroll, and sales in the taxing state to reasonably approximate the taxpayer’s taxable 
activity (i.e., income) in the state. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (observing that the fair apportionment prong would 
be violated only if “the income attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate 
proportions to the business transacted . . . in that State,’” before observing that the 
three-factor property, payroll, and sales formula had “met our approval, [and had] 
become . . . something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas 
are judged.’”). The Container Corp. Court indicated that a deviation from the 
absolutely accurate tax base of “approximately 14%” would not be “out of all 
appropriate proportion” whereas a deviation of “more than 250%” would be. Id. at 
184. 
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clear and compelling evidence of their compliance costs and benefits, 
and states could adopt conservative proxies to head off most 
challenges. States could also avoid placing tax obligations on people 
not directly connected to the activity taxed because such obligations 
are more difficult to comply with that obligations placed on people 
directly connected with the activity taxed.217 Finally, states that wish 
to avoid dormant Commerce Clause nexus controversies could always 
simplify their taxes and assume the compliance costs associated with 
them.218 In other words, the states would control their dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus destinies under the proposed standard. 
Although the standard is proposed in a neutral effort to bring clarity 
and reason to the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement, the 
standard might be criticized as promoting a pro-state or anti-taxpayer 
agenda. This criticism fails to consider whether the pre-Wayfair status 
quo struck an appropriate balance between states and taxpayers. The 
pre-Wayfair personal nexus rules were a thorn in most states’ sides, as 
the multitude of efforts to undermine the rules demonstrate.219 The 
traditional transactional nexus rules impose unnecessarily formalistic 
restrictions on certain state tax actions.220 Loosening these rules in an 
effort to more accurately track whether state tax systems place undue 
burdens on interstate commerce is likely to broaden state tax 
authority.221 But according to the compliance burden theory, that 
authority should have been broader all along; prior doctrine was 
inappropriately anti-state, and cleaning up the doctrine would place 
taxpayers and states in a sounder balance. 
In sum, the compliance burden theory underlying the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement leads to fairly narrow 
protections against undue burdens on interstate commerce.222 Properly 
understood, the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement simply 
carves out an amount of interstate activity that may cross a state’s line 
and not be subject to the state’s taxing power: that amount of interstate 
activity that would not continue if the taxpayer were made to bear the 
costs of tax compliance. Adopting such a standard would bring clarity 
to a murky area of law and allow for the appropriate amount of 
                                                 
217 See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
218 See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 503-12 (discussing this option 
and how states might implement it). 
219 See Holderness, supra note 35, at 414-19 (surveying efforts to overturn the 
physical presence rule). 
220 See supra Part I.A.2. 
221 See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 117-19 (discussing the effects of loosening 
the substantial nexus standards). 
222 This standard achieves goals proposed by economists for appropriate nexus 
standards. See Charles E. McLure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes -- And 
the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 2002 ST. TAX TODAY 179-2, *6 (Sep. 16, 2002) 
(“Nexus (duty to collect tax) should depend on having either a substantial physical 
presence or a non-de minimis amount of sales in a state . . . .”). 
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flexibility needed for state taxes to adapt to changing tax and business 
practices over time. 
III. BRINGING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS DOCTRINE IN 
LINE WITH THEORY 
The crossroads created by the Wayfair decision offer the 
opportunity to clarify and stabilize the protections of the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement. Failing to do so, say by 
allowing the nexus standard to completely collapse into the due 
process personal jurisdiction standard, would open the door to 
unprincipled expansions of state tax power and uncertain tax 
obligations that may burden interstate commerce, particularly the 
activities of small businesses and of entities that facilitate the 
commerce of others, such as online marketplaces similar to Amazon 
Marketplace, payment intermediaries like MasterCard, and common 
carriers such as FedEx. 
This Part details how the compliance burden theory and the 
proposed nexus standard can be unambiguously incorporated into 
existing substantial nexus doctrine by focusing on the resolution of 
three post-Wayfair issues that may be soon litigated. Though the term 
“substantial nexus” may be troublesome in its current state,223 it does 
offer an expedient way to establish the protections of the proposed 
standard in the case law. Courts and state tax lawyers have been using 
the term for decades, and the Supreme Court seems unwilling to 
completely abandon it, as Wayfair demonstrates. Rather than let it 
fester in limbo, “substantial nexus” should be infused with meaning. 
That said, the proposed standard need not find a home in the 
“substantial nexus” term; if that term were abandoned, there would still 
be a need to evaluate the burden tax compliance costs place on the 
interstate taxpayer. 
The three post-Wayfair issues considered below include the 
constitutionality of imposing sales and use tax collection obligations 
on someone other than the vendor or the customer, the vitality of the 
formalism of the traditional transactional nexus doctrine, and whether 
substantial nexus is needed at both the state and the local level when 
local taxes are imposed. The key to appropriately developing the 
substantial nexus doctrine through these issues is to recognize the 
prominence of transactional nexus in the analysis and to adopt a 
coherent transactional nexus standard, regardless of how Wayfair’s 
“substantial privilege of carrying on business” personal nexus standard 
is interpreted. 
                                                 
223 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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A. Nexus between Taxpayer and Activity Taxed: The Case of 
Marketplace Collection Obligations 
South Dakota’s win in Wayfair has predictably been embraced by 
the states, as demonstrated by a rush of legislative activity to bring 
statutory personal nexus rules in line with the decision.224 Many states 
(including South Dakota) are going further than the original South 
Dakota model, which requires vendors who collected gross receipts of 
more than $100,000 from sales to South Dakotans or who made more 
than 200 individual sales to South Dakotans in the prior year to collect 
the state’s sales tax.225 These states are extending tax collection 
obligations to marketplaces, like Amazon Marketplace, eBay and Etsy, 
that facilitate sales between vendors and customers.226 These laws 
cover entities that allow third-party vendors to use their platform to 
reach customers. 
These marketplace collection laws often place a tax collection 
obligation on the marketplace once sales made through its platform 
pass the same thresholds that apply to the individual vendors.227 Such 
an obligation can attach on a collective basis, so once enough sales are 
made on the platform, regardless of who the vendor is, the marketplace 
becomes responsible for tax collection. For example, South Dakota’s 
marketplace collection law requires the marketplace to collect the 
state’s sales tax if the marketplace “[f]acilitates the sales of two or 
more marketplace sellers that, when the sales are combined, are subject 
to [the South Dakota law at issue in Wayfair], even if the marketplace 
sellers are not separately or individually subject to [that law].”228 
A clear policy behind these marketplace collection laws is to push 
tax collection obligations to the most consolidated levels possible, on 
the belief that economies of scale at such levels will smooth the 
                                                 
224 See Roxanne Bland, South Dakota v. Wayfair: The Fallout, 90 ST. TAX 
NOTES 621, 621 (2018) (“After the U.S. Supreme Court’s June ruling in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair jettisoned the rule equating physical presence with substantial 
nexus for purposes of requiring remote vendors selling into a state to collect that 
state’s sales tax, many sales tax states rushed to draft new economic nexus standards 
to drop into their tax codes.”); Pomp, supra note 125 (detailing states’ post-Wayfair 
legislative efforts). 
225 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2. 
226 See Ala. H.B. 470 (2018); Conn. S.B. 417 (2018); Iowa S.B. 2417 (2018); 
Ky. H.B. 366 (2018); Minn. H.F. 1 (2018); Okla. H.B. 1019 (2018); Pa. H.B. 542 
(2017); R.I. H.B. 5175 (2017); South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018); Wash. 
H.B. 2163 (2018); see also Multistate Tax Comm’n, White Paper regarding Issues 
in the Implementation of the Wayfair Decision, *4 (Nov. 7, 2018), available at 
https://perma.cc/UHQ4-TXK7 [hereinafter, MTC, White Paper]; Jad Chamseddine, 
2019: The Year of Marketplace Legislation, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 1096, 1096 (2018); 
Lauren Loricchio, States Want Marketplace Facilitators to Collect Tax for Small 
Sellers, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 749, 749 (2018); Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch, 
Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112. 
227 E.g. South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018). 
228 South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018). 
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collection of taxes.229 One marketplace could collect and remit taxes 
instead of thousands of individual vendors. In theory, this state of 
affairs could ease the administrative burden on a state to receive taxes 
collected and to audit tax collectors.230 In addition, the laws will 
predictably expand the number of sales on which tax is collected 
because the marketplaces will be collecting tax on sales made by 
vendors who are individually not subject to collection obligations.231 
As others note, this expansion increases fairness of treatment between 
vendors;232 the states also figure to collect more taxes through these 
laws.233 It is not difficult to imagine states playing with the idea of 
extending these types of laws to cover additional entities that facilitate 
the commerce of others, such as payment intermediaries and common 
carriers.234 
Given the loosening of the personal nexus standard in Wayfair, 
these marketplace collection laws may pass constitutional muster,235 
but they should not be guaranteed success given the compliance costs 
they will place on the marketplaces and the indirect benefits the 
marketplaces may receive from the taxing states. Take the example of 
Etsy, which vendors located around the country use to connect with 
customers. Assume there are one hundred vendors using Etsy that sell 
into South Dakota and that their sales collectively satisfy the state’s 
statutory personal nexus rule. South Dakota’s law would require Etsy 
to collect the sales taxes imposed on the transactions that occur on its 
platform as long as the constitutional substantial nexus standard is met. 
Current personal nexus doctrine appears not to obstruct South 
Dakota’s efforts significantly. If Etsy is purposefully exploiting the 
                                                 
229 See Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096 (“The trend is happening mainly 
because it is more fruitful for states to require collection by marketplace providers. 
‘It makes a lot more sense for states to have marketplace platforms or facilitators 
registered and collecting rather than having to deal with hundreds or thousands of 
marketplace sellers individually,’ said Marshall Stranburg, deputy executive director 
of the Multistate Tax Commission.”); MTC, White Paper, supra note 226, at *3 (“In 
order to increase sales/use tax collection compliance levels, several states are 
imposing requirements on marketplace facilitators to collect and remit the sales/use 
tax on their marketplace sales.”). 
230 See Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096; MTC, White Paper, supra note 
226, at *3. 
231 See Loricchio, supra note 226, at 749. 
232 Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch, Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112. 
233 Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096 (“States that don’t expand their remote 
sales tax collection requirements to marketplaces could ‘miss out on a huge chunk’ 
of revenue, according to Richard Cram, also of the MTC.”). 
234 See Rifat Azam & Orly Mazur, Cloudy with a Chance of Taxation, 21 FLA. 
TAX REV. ___ (forthcoming) (arguing for requiring payment intermediaries to collect 
excise taxes on cloud computing transactions that they facilitate). 
235 See Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch, Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112; 
but see Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 16, at 134 (“Nor is it clear whether a state 
may compel the marketplace facilitator to collect and remit use tax for its client, the 
remote seller.”). 
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state’s marketplace, say by supporting vendors in the state or selling 
into the state and deriving income therefrom, then it will have exposed 
itself to personal nexus with the state.236 A court might follow 
Wayfair’s lead and declare personal nexus to exist because it thinks 
Etsy has “purposefully availed itself of the substantial privilege of 
carrying on business” in the state.237 However, this analysis should 
give states and Etsy pause; personal nexus might not exist if the 
substantial nexus standard is allowed to advance past Wayfair’s vague 
expression.238 
Under the proposed substantial nexus standard, if the compliance 
costs of collecting the sales tax imposed on the marketplace rendered 
the marketplace’s activities in the state unprofitable, personal nexus 
would not exist (i.e. Etsy would not have availed itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business in the state). One 
challenge under the proposed standard would lie in determining the 
profitability of the marketplace’s facilitation of sales in the state. The 
other challenge would be determining the compliance costs imposed 
on the marketplace by the taxing state. 
At first glance, it is not clear that any given marketplace would be 
benefiting from the taxing state simply by helping unrelated vendors 
benefit from the state by facilitating those vendors’ sales into the state. 
The analysis would first need to determine if the marketplace’s 
activities outside of the taxing state could be attributed to the state. 
This analysis would likely depend on the arrangement between the 
marketplace and its vendors: what does the marketplace do for its 
vendors and what does it earn from each vendor for those services, 
particularly with respect to the taxing state? If the marketplace actively 
promotes its platform in the state and collects fees based on a per-
transaction basis, this task may be relatively straight-forward; if the 
marketplace is more passive or general fees are collected, then the task 
may become harder. This analysis should be expected to separate 
active marketplaces like Etsy from more passive ones like Craigslist. 
Issues exist on the compliance costs side of the analysis as well. 
There is an important difference between the vendor who is asked to 
collect taxes on her own sales and the marketplace that is asked to 
collect taxes on someone else’s sales. The vendor has direct knowledge 
                                                 
236 See supra Part I.A.1. 
237 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
238 Wayfair may have cut off the path to such advancement of the personal nexus 
standard when it indicated that some other aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause 
should address tax compliance costs. See id. (“The question remains whether some 
other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”). 
Even if the path to advancing the personal nexus standard is cut off, substantial nexus 
doctrine can still align with theory through the development of the transactional 
nexus standard, which is the more important of the two aspects of the substantial 
nexus requirement. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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of the transaction, direct access to the information required to 
accurately collect taxes, and direct access to the funds needed to pay 
the tax; the marketplace does not.239 The marketplace would have to 
retrieve that information from the individual vendors and may have to 
pay the taxes out-of-pocket and seek redress through costly measures 
such as legal suits against vendors or customers.240  
The marketplace’s indirect connection to the transactions at issue 
is most concerning for the increased costs of addressing audit risks; the 
marketplace may need to rely on vendors for information necessary to 
comply with the state tax law, and vendor errors could increase the 
marketplace’s costs of interacting with a state taxing authority.241 By 
taking these costs into account, the personal nexus standard would 
reflect an understanding that the taxpayer’s connection to the activity 
taxed matters.242 In the case of the marketplace collection laws, 
collecting tax on other people’s sales may burden a marketplace too 
much, such that it forbids vendors to make sales into the taxing state 
                                                 
239 This is not to say that the marketplace could not easily acquire such 
information from the vendors, but in the first instance, the marketplace does not have 
that information and must incur some cost to retrieve it. See infra notes 243-245 and 
accompanying text. 
240 For example, the South Dakota marketplace collection law treats the sales 
from the vendor as sales for resale, placing the burden on the marketplace to collect 
from the ultimate consumer. South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled 
Sept. 12, 2018). A major source of compliance costs in the sales and use tax area is 
determining which sales are exempt from tax, which includes the collection and 
verification of exemption certificates from tax-exempt purchasers such as business 
who are not purchasing the goods at retail. See, e.g., Cara Griffeth, Streamlining 
Versus “Amazon” Laws: The Remote Seller Dilemma, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 351, 354 
(2010) (“Determining how to handle tax-exempt sales, sales tax holidays, and 
product taxability coding can be a daunting task, particularly for small and midsize 
businesses. It has been estimated that sales tax exemptions account for 60 percent of 
the cost of compliance for small businesses.”); Dick Eppleman, Tax Practitioners 
and State Auditors Focus on Managing Sales Tax Exemption Certificate, 16-FEB J. 
MULTISTATE TAXATION 26 (2007) (detailing compliance burdens associated with 
exemption certificates); Britt C. Dobbins & Wendy M. Leonard, Compliance 
Strategies Regarding Resale and Other Sales Tax Exemption Certificates, 16-FEB J. 
MULTISTATE TAXATION 14 (2003) (discussing common issues associated with 
exemption certificates). As the tax collector becomes further removed from the 
purchaser, it may be more and more costly to obtain and verify those certificates. 
241 See Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-39 (detailing the impact that the 
relationship between the taxpayer and the activity taxed can have on the burden 
placed on the taxpayer to collect taxes); see also Paul Jones, Etsy Releases List of 
States Where It Collects Sales Taxes, 2019 ST. TAX TODAY 15-6 (Jan. 23, 2019) 
(“[Etsy] said collecting sales and use tax for multiple taxing jurisdictions using 
different rules is complicated and difficult, and urged sellers to support its effort to 
lobby lawmakers to back federal legislation that would standardize rules. ‘Our 
experience in [in Washington and Pennsylvania] . . . has shown us how hard it is to 
properly classify the 50 million handmade, craft, and vintage goods . . . into taxable 
item categories,’ Etsy said.”). 
242 See id. (arguing that even under the physical presence regime, the dormant 
Commerce Clause demanded some connection between the taxpayer and the activity 
taxed). 
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using its platform. However, where the state’s market is important 
enough to the marketplace, the compliance costs should not present a 
significant hurdle to South Dakota’s efforts. 
This observation highlights that the personal nexus inquiry need 
not impose a high burden on states.243 Etsy could demand that its 
vendors transmit transaction information to it in a reasonable 
manner.244 If all marketplaces did this, Etsy would not suffer market 
share because of the action and much of the harm might dissipate. 
Sifting through many different vendors’ transactions may be costlier 
than only dealing with one’s own sales, but the statutory thresholds 
could be adjusted to account for this discrepancy.  
The important point is that personal nexus standard should take 
into account how the state tax system affects different taxpayers, 
bringing the standard closer in line with the traditional Pike balancing 
test and better fulfilling the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine. The taxpayer’s connection with the activity taxed is an 
important indicator of the burden of compliance costs, and as that 
connection becomes weaker and less direct, the demands of personal 
nexus should be expected to increase.245 The personal nexus of entities 
that facilitate the commerce of others, like marketplaces, payment 
intermediaries, and common carriers, necessitate a close look under 
the proposed standard. 
The above analysis highlights a second point about the proposed 
substantial nexus standard: transactional nexus is the prominent 
concern, not personal nexus. In the above example, though the analysis 
is framed as developing the personal nexus standard, recognizing the 
importance of the relationship between the taxpayer and the activity 
taxed would wed the personal nexus standard to the transactional 
nexus standard. When the compliance costs imposed by the sales tax 
would cause the interstate sales activity to cease, transactional nexus 
with the taxing state should not exist. And Etsy, as the taxpayer, should 
also lack personal nexus with the taxing state when those interstate 
sales would cease. To be clear, Etsy would not have to stop interacting 
with the taxing state, it would just be protected from tax obligations 
until its activities were profitable enough to cover the tax compliance 
costs. 
Thus, a theoretically-sound substantial nexus standard could do 
away with the personal nexus inquiry,246 but given the prominence of 
the inquiry in the Wayfair case, courts are not primed to abandon the 
personal nexus aspect of the substantial nexus doctrine. The above 
                                                 
243 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
244 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 241 (detailing Etsy’s sales tax collection efforts). 
245 Cf. Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-39. 
246 See supra note 198. 
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approach to personal nexus would at least bring the doctrine closer in 
line with theory but has the potential to fail to prevent undue burdens 
on interstate commerce when the taxpayer has a large presence in the 
state unrelated to the activity taxed.247 For example, Washington State 
would likely find personal nexus with Seattle-based Amazon.com for 
almost any kind of tax, regardless of the specific compliance costs 
associated with the tax. Some case law even indicates that a taxpayer’s 
nexus with a state need not be related to the transaction taxed by the 
state, though this case law appears to be grounded in the Due Process 
Clause rather than the dormant Commerce Clause.248 Thus, the above 
approach to personal nexus might not provide the appropriate 
protections against undue burdens on interstate commerce,249 but 
developing the transactional nexus standard as described in the next 
section can ensure that those protections exist. 
B. Ghosts of Transactional Nexus: The Ongoing Vitality of Sales 
and Use Tax Formalism 
As noted, the issue in Wayfair was personal nexus, but the South 
Dakota statute had a lurking transactional nexus issue.250 That issue 
resulted from the fact that the South Dakota statute only requires 
remote vendors to collect sales taxes; there is no obligation to collect 
use taxes.251 In fact, South Dakota doubled down on its disregard for 
this issue by passing a marketplace collection bill that also only applies 
to the collection of sales taxes.252 If South Dakota lacks transactional 
nexus with out-of-state sales—as the pre-Wayfair jurisprudence 
                                                 
247 Given historical practice and the lack of clear guidance from the Wayfair 
Court, courts should be expected to find personal nexus where the taxpayer has a 
high amount of activity in the taxing state, particularly where the taxpayer has a 
physical presence in the state. Even the Wayfair Court was taken in by the amount 
of activity in the state, simply stating that such amount of activity met the substantial 
nexus standard without deeper explanation. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 
S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). However, a prominent practitioner has suggested that a 
taxpayer could challenge a finding of substantial nexus based on its physical 
presence in the taxing state, arguing that after Wayfair, physical presence alone is 
not enough to establish personal nexus. See Amy Hamilton, What Will the First Post-
Wayfair Litigation Look Like?, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 609, 609-08 (2018) (discussing 
comments of Leah Robinson). 
248 See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 
561 (1977). In determining that the taxpayer’s nexus did not depend on the activity 
taxed by the state, the Nat’l Geographic Soc’y Court claimed that the test was 
“simply whether the facts demonstrate ‘some definite link, some minimum 
connection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax’” and cited to the 
Miller Brothers case for support. This language used by the Court parallels due 
process standards for nexus, not those of the dormant Commerce Clause, and Miller 
Brothers is best viewed as a due process case, as argued earlier. See supra note 57; 
see also Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-38 (arguing that Nat’l Geographic Soc’y 
is not controlling for dormant Commerce Clause purposes). 
249 See Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 16, at 291-92. 
250 See supra note 127. 
251 See S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2. 
252 See South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018). 
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suggests that it does253—then any attempt to require vendors to collect 
those sales taxes should fail. In contrast, it is clear under the 
jurisprudence that South Dakota could require vendors to collect use 
taxes on the products that they sell into the state for use there, making 
the limited scope of the South Dakota statutes a seemingly incredible 
foot-fault for the state.254 States like South Dakota who impose only 
sales tax collection obligations on remote sellers have left themselves 
vulnerable to legal challenge.255  
If Wayfair is read to reject this transactional nexus formalism, then 
a challenge to a law like South Dakota’s would fail. However, the 
Wayfair Court’s cavalier approach to the transactional nexus issue 
makes reliance on such a reading risky. Even so, accepting that 
Wayfair did not directly dismantle the historical formalism created by 
transactional nexus doctrine does not require accepting that the 
decision did not provide the tools for dismantling that formalism in 
future. Should a remote vendor challenge a sales-tax-only collection 
regime, the courts would have to confront the transactional nexus issue 
head on. 
Under current doctrine, the states would likely lose in such a 
challenge against their efforts to tax out-of-state sales.256 However, 
Wayfair provides courts with the basis to explicitly abandon the 
formalistic distinction between sales taxes and use taxes by bringing 
the transactional nexus standard in line with the compliance burden 
theory. Wayfair began this task in the personal nexus context, and that 
alignment should be continued in the transactional nexus context.  
A court approaching the transactional nexus issue should recognize 
Wayfair’s concern with compliance costs and establish that those costs 
associated with the particular activity taxed cannot be allowed to cause 
the activity to cease in the state. There is no place in this analysis for 
categorical declarations that transactional nexus does or does not exist 
with respect to a particular form of taxation.257 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has demanded that the substance rather than the form of a tax 
control its constitutionality; to determine the substance of a tax, the 
Court asks who or what the tax is economically imposed on.258 
                                                 
253 See supra Part I.A.2. 
254 See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125. Although there is an easy legislative 
fix to this problem—expanding the statutes to cover the collection of use taxes, the 
experience in South Dakota has shown that some states may be unaware of the 
gravity of the issue or unwilling to address it. See Pomp, supra note 125. 
255 See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125. 
256 See supra Part I.A.2. Dilworth prohibits a state from imposing a sales tax on 
sales consummated outside of the state. 
257 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
258 See generally Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) 
(rejecting formalistic labels as controlling the constitutionality of a state tax and 
instead looking to economic realities of the tax); see also Comptroller of Treasury of 
Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015) (“We see no reason why the 
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Although sales taxes and use taxes are formally imposed on separate 
transactions, they have largely been thought of as economically 
equivalent taxes on consumption.259 
Therefore, the only proper room for difference in the jurisdictional 
reach of sales taxes and use taxes (or any taxes) under the dormant 
Commerce Clause should result from differences in their compliance 
costs, as the proposed standard recognizes. Any concerns that 
loosening the transactional nexus standard would allow states to tax 
transactions beyond their borders are more appropriately addressed by 
due process protections against extraterritoriality and the requirements 
of the apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test rather than by 
the substantial nexus prong.260 
Breathing life into the transactional nexus standard as proposed 
would result in a theoretically-sound substantial nexus standard 
regardless of what the courts do with the personal nexus doctrine. The 
proposed standard would ensure that the compliance costs associated 
with each tax are considered and would protect taxpayers from undue 
costs related to small amounts of interstate activity in a state. 
C. Over 10,000 Taxing Jurisdictions: Substantial Local Nexus 
A final post-Wayfair issue to consider is whether substantial nexus 
will be required at the local level as well as the state level.261 Many 
                                                 
distinction between gross receipts and net income should matter, particularly in light 
of the admonition that we must consider ‘not the formal language of the tax statute 
but rather its practical effect.’”) (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279); Walter 
Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre, & Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause Restraints 
on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47, 49 (1995). As Gamage 
and Heckman note, “[w]ho bears a tax or subsidy is a function of the relative price 
elasticities of supply and demand and is not fixed by who has a legal obligation to 
pay the tax.” Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 486 n. 18; see also Hellerstein, 
McIntyre, & Pomp, supra, at 54 n. 42. 
259 See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 347 (2018); McLure, supra note 72, 
at ¶¶ 9-16. Because the use tax is often framed as merely a backstop to the sales tax, 
see POMP, supra note 72, at 6-39 to 6-43, the substantial nexus jurisprudence up to 
Wayfair had pushed use taxes into the shadow of sales taxes, and the transactional 
nexus standard for use taxes was not extended to sales taxes, which would have 
alleviated many of the formalism concerns in this area. See Holderness, supra note 
18, at 345-55 (tracing how use taxes were unnecessarily pushed into the shadow of 
sales taxes for nexus purposes). 
260 See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text. 
261 See Joe Crosby, Kendall L. Houghton, Stephen P. Kranz, Diann L. Smith, & 
Doug Sheppard, Wayfair: The Present and Future of State Taxes, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 
1073, 1076-77 (2018) (“[O]ne other question that follows on Wayfair is whether we 
will see localities attempting to use Wayfair-like authority to reach outside their 
borders, even outside the state they’re in, and impose local business licensing or other 
types of imposition on companies that are making sales into the locality.”); Sarah 
Horn, Jill McNally, & Rebecca Newton-Clarke, One by One, Most States Responded 
to South Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018, RIA STATE & LOCAL TAX UPDATE (Dec. 12, 
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localities impose their own taxes—Chief Justice Roberts noted in his 
Wayfair dissent that there are “over 10,000 jurisdictions [that] levy 
sales taxes”262—and these local taxes conform to state-level taxes in 
varying degrees.263 Additionally, some localities administer their own 
taxes, whereas others rely on the state to administer their taxes.264 
Thus, a real possibility exists that a local-level tax could impose 
significant additional compliance costs on an interstate taxpayer or 
activity, such that the taxpayer might avoid conducting activities in 
that locality.265 This result would seem to violate the demands of the 
compliance burden theory. 
However, localities come into existence differently than states. The 
states are creations of the people and have divested some of their 
powers to the federal government, as relevant here, the power to 
regulate interstate commerce.266 Localities are creations of the states 
and often are viewed as mere extensions of the state.267 In other words, 
by creating a locality, the state merely decentralizes some of its 
operations in favor of various goals.268 With the source of local power 
in mind, it becomes unclear whether local-level substantial nexus is 
needed once state-level substantial nexus exists. 
Although current substantial nexus doctrine does not provide a 
clear answer to the issue, the problem is not as troubling as it might 
appear. As a practical matter, the local-level substantial nexus question 
is currently trivial. The South Dakota model for statutory substantial 
nexus provisions—which most states have followed269—imposes 
thresholds designed to protect small vendors from being subject to the 
state’s tax obligations.270 As such, these thresholds likely do not come 
                                                 
2018) (discussing the confusion brought about as a result of the Wayfair decision, 
including when a business must collect local taxes). 
262 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). 
263 See POMP, supra note 72, at 6-44 to 6-46. 
264 See id. 
265 See Roxanne Bland, supra note 224, at 623-24 (discussing concerns about 
the impact of a complex web of local taxes on Colorado’s efforts to implement a 
South Dakota-style nexus statute). 
266 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, at 7-8 (8th ed. 2016). 
267 Id. at 8-9; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1990) (discussing the role of the local 
government in relation to the state). 
268 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 266, at 9-16; see also Yishai Blank, 
Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263, 270-77 (2006) 
(discussing various goals localities are argued to achieve). 
269 See supra note 224. 
270 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2 (imposing thresholds of $100,000 of gross 
revenue from sales into the state or 200 separate sales into the state before statutory 
personal nexus exists); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 
(2018) (“[T]he Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business 
in South Dakota.”). 
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close to the constitutional line for substantial nexus; any person or 
activity exceeding the thresholds likely established constitutional 
substantial nexus long before the thresholds were met. This statement 
may not be true in all instances, but on the assumption that the states 
will continue with the South Dakota model and not draw close to the 
constitutional line for substantial nexus, it seems unlikely that the 
added compliance burdens of local taxes would trigger constitutional 
concerns; the statutes will protect interstate commerce more than the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
If the proposed substantial nexus standard is implemented, then the 
issue of local-level substantial nexus becomes a non-issue. The 
substantial nexus standard would permit those tax obligations that do 
not overwhelm the interstate commerce with compliance costs, such 
that the taxpayer would cease the activity in the taxing jurisdiction. 
This standard necessitates a tax-by-tax examination in order to 
determine whether the appropriate substantial nexus exists in each 
case.  
Therefore, a vendor asked to collect a local tax would have grounds 
to challenge that specific locality’s action if the tax’s compliance 
burden was too high. Alternatively, and to the same practical effect, if 
one views the locality simply as an extension of the state, then the state 
would lack substantial nexus with the taxpayer or activity when the 
local taxes increased the compliance burdens above the constitutional 
line. Substantial nexus at the state level could be restored by 
eliminating the local tax in that instance or by reducing the differences 
between the state- and local-level taxes and the complexities those 
differences create. In other words, if a state feels that its ability to 
impose taxes is impaired on substantial nexus grounds because of the 
complexity of local taxes, the state can reign those local taxes in. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Wayfair decision brought the dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus doctrine into the twenty-first century and thus was one of the 
most impactful in the field of state and local taxation since the Quill 
case it partially overturned. As a result of its abandonment of the 
historical physical presence rule for personal nexus, Wayfair might be 
read to have pushed the dormant Commerce Clause’s nexus 
requirement towards the Due Process Clause’s personal jurisdiction 
requirement. Alternatively, the case could be read to have begun the 
work of establishing a nexus doctrine that more coherently addresses 
the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
This Article has argued for the latter reading and continues the 
work of Wayfair by fully developing the compliance burden theory of 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus and the standard that follows from 
that theory. The Article also mapped out the path for incorporating this 
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theoretically-sound nexus standard into the jurisprudence through 
future litigation that unanswered questions from Wayfair should spur. 
Ensuring that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine continues 
to come into alignment with theory will prevent the protections of the 
doctrine from withering away and will ensure that interstate 
commerce—particularly that conducted by small businesses and 
online marketplaces—is not subjected to undue burdens from state tax 
compliance costs. With a little help, Wayfair can be the beginning of 
the way forward for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine, 
not the end. 
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